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A HYPOTHETICAL MENTAL CONSTITUTION OF COMPULSIVE THINKERS[1]

BY JOHN T. McCURDY.

I REGRET to say that this paper must begin with an apology, for it represents no contribution to sound learning. There are to follow no generalizations, deduced from a series of cases, and controlled by a further series of observations. This is because my present situation makes the examination of a patient a rare event and so I can neither prove nor disprove the validity of my scheme. It may be sound or it may be fantastic. It is merely an hypothesis to answer questions and get around difficulties that have puzzled me for years. Essentially, then, it is an exercise in academic speculation and, as such, I am prepared to defend it on the grounds of inherent probability or internal consistency, but not to buttress it with a sufficient series of consistent facts. Since facts, in my experience, are more stable than theories, or, to put it in another way, observations less liable to error than reasoning, I am quite prepared to scrap the hypothesis if facts prove to be against it. I am therefore anxious to get the facts and hope to do so here and, if not now, from the subsequent experience of you who are engaged in active practice.

At the outset I should explain the sense in which I am using the term "compulsive thinking." For the purposes of the present discussion I wish it to have a wider reference than the impulses of compulsive neurotics. Everyone is familiar with the phenomenon of ideas appearing in consciousness unattended with sufficient introspected associations to make the thoughts seem of conscious origin, the natural products of previous conscious ideas. Such thoughts, we are now accustomed to assume, come from the unconscious. The normal fate of these intrusions is that they suffer an immediate, often instantaneous criticism as to their validity or appropriateness, which is followed by conscious acceptance or rejection. When an idea is compulsive it appears unbidden, is adversely criticized, but does *not* go away. Moreover it keeps recurring throughout the waking day in an embarrassing and often harrowing way. These ideas act as impulses to action, memories or fantasies. This last category is important, for it enables us to include here an adaptive mental

[1] Read before the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society on Feb. 25, 1926.

anomaly. With some people, if a problem is to be solved, the unconscious produces a solution; this is criticized and rejected as impossible. Another and another solution is offered by the unconscious until the right one comes. This is characteristic of the creative thinker. The ordinary person gives up the quest after one or two failures. In what we may speak of as the genius type, temperamentally, failure puts no end to the process. Here it is the idea of solution which is compulsive rather than the specific attempts at solution. The common man can abolish the whole process with the conclusion "There is no solution" when a few attempts are unsuccessful. It is important to note that the genius cannot dismiss the problem if he would: he suffers from the idea of solution in a way highly analogous to the torture of the patient with compulsive thoughts.

We are thus confronted with our most central problem. Why should there ever be a persistence in an unprofitable train of thought? Yet this phenomenon is present in all gradations from the repetition in compulsive neurotics of ridiculous or abhorrent single ideas, through obsessive memories of real events, on to the maintenance of a train of thought apparently futile but ultimately adaptive. Here a paradox appears. The dismissal of maladaptive thoughts from consciousness seems to be an intellectual function and an exercise of what is called will-power. Now in other respects the people presenting such anomalies are neither weak-willed nor feeble-minded. In fact they are apt to be stubborn and, as a group, well above the average in intelligence. We are therefore forced to conclude that the compulsive thoughts are either unaffected by intellectual guidance and elaboration, which seems improbable, or else that intelligence is working merely in the interests of unconscious motivations.

An analogous puzzle is presented by the response to analytic treatment. According to theory, when unconscious lusts are brought into consciousness, they can be dealt with and controlled, an influence impossible to exercise so long as they are out of contact with the conscious personality. The control is effected through intelligence, a tool that is wielded by that peculiar mental activity we call the will. We should therefore expect that a person possessing a strong will and a good intelligence and confronted with the previously unconscious lawless elements in his personality, that have been expressing themselves as symptoms, would straightway begin to subjugate these aberrant impulses and recover. But I understand that psycho-analytical experience has shown repeatedly that, although compulsive neuroses are not invariably refractive to treatment, they are nevertheless extremely

difficult to eradicate. One gets the impression that, in spite of the discomfort the patients are experiencing, and much as they are obviously desirous of losing each specific symptom, they still are fearful of getting well for some queer reason. In the course of the analysis this reason becomes manifest: it is another symptom, subtle and deadly. We are all of us loath to part with our pet theories and prejudices, the types of reaction that are peculiar to our personalities. Yet we can listen to argument and, with an effort, we can change our attitudes towards many of the problems of life. The compulsive thinker has so much difficulty in effecting such a change of outlook that it amounts to a symptom. A suggestion in this direction is a signal for panic or inconsolable dejection. If the patient be assured that his recovery depends on such a reorganization within himself, he thinks that that spells an impossibility or, at least, he acts as if that were his conclusion. He would rather worry along with his symptoms or give up the quest of mental comfort, even life itself, than submit to what seems to him a loss of his individuality.

This, it seems to me, is the immediate cause of the obduracy to treatment which the compulsive neurotics present. Curiously enough, the maintenance or abandonment of individuality seems to be the crucial factor in quite another type of regenerating experience, which is often singularly effective in abolishing symptoms. This is religious experience. Here the price that is paid for the inward peace and the associated self-control is the giving up of self. An excellent example of this is given in James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*. The subject had been a drunkard who, the day after his first religious experience, got drunk again. "About midday I made on my knees the first prayer before God for twenty years. I did not ask to be forgiven; I felt that was no good, for I would be sure to fall again. Well, what did I do? I committed myself to Him in the profoundest belief that my individuality was going to be destroyed, that He would take all from me, and I was willing. In such a surrender lies the secret of a holy life. From that hour drink has had no terrors for me: I never touch it, never want it."

With this may be compared the reaction of a patient of mine to the suggestion that his symptoms would not disappear if he were unwilling to make any alteration of his attitude towards life. He was suffering from the repetition of harrowing memories, often taking the form of hallucinations, which had been coming on every night for months and deprived him of almost all his sleep. He was an unusually intelligent

and honest introspectionist. The time came when it was necessary to point out to him that he would never be able to utilize the facts and fancies revealed in the analysis unless he was prepared to modify his point of view. His reply was that this was tantamount to asking him to abandon his personality and that willy-nilly it was impossible. He said that he would struggle on for a while to see if his symptoms would disappear of themselves and that if they did not, he would commit suicide! Although his honesty and bravery were unusual, my experience would indicate that behaviouristically all patients of this class tend to show the same response to the first suggestion of what may be interpreted as a change in personality. This is one of our basic problems: why is the personality of the compulsive thinker so sacred; with what taboo is it guarded?

The last characteristic of this peculiar personality, which we must consider, is unconscious sadism. This was first discovered by Freud and has been confirmed by all other psycho-analysts. When compulsive ideas are concerned directly or indirectly with injury to others, their basis in unconscious sadism is sufficiently understandable to seem obvious—to any psycho-analyst, at least. But why there should be such a disproportion between sadism and the other partial impulses, is a real problem. To say that there has been a fixation at a sadistic stage comes dangerously near to tautology, unless it can be shown that there is a more or less constant type of influence at work in these people which has halted development at this point.

An even more puzzling conjunction is that of unconscious sadism with exercise of intelligence. The cruelty of wit, thanks to Freud's brilliant analysis, we can understand. But I suppose that others than myself have seen evidence in their patients of unconscious sadism motivating intellectual keenness that seems to have the discomfiture of no one in view. In other words mental acuity seems to be one mode of expression for sadism and this may be quite constructive in character. Constructive intelligence is at bottom fantasy-building. If the fantasies in question had the injury or destruction of others as their object, the association would be understandable. But evidence for this is often lacking. Of all the aberrations of sex none is, of its very nature, so definitely inimical to constructiveness as sadism. One might suspect that we were here dealing with some kind of a reaction formation. But sympathy—the antidote to cruelty—although not destructive is certainly not constructive in tendency. It works much more for the maintenance of the *status quo*. The conclusion seems therefore justifiable that the

connection between sadism and constructive thinking is not direct and causal in spite of the intimacy of the association. We are consequently forced to look for some other impulse with constructive potentialities so closely integrated with the sadism that action of the one means action of the other, that they reinforce one another mutually. What can this *X* be?

A hint may, perhaps be secured by correlating this problem with the one before. The compulsive thinker acts as if in terror of loss of his personality. He also acts as if he must destroy something—something, moreover, that is dear to him, else it would not be sadism. Here, then, is the sketch of a conflict and, judged by its seriousness, a deadly one. Now in any fight the issue depends on the comparative powers of the antagonists. Weakening of self is strength to the opponent; strength to one's self is a weakening of the opponent. Thus we arrive at a clue. Our search must be for some conflict still progressing in the unconscious. The personality of the patient is threatened; he can protect himself by destroying another or by making himself the stronger. One characteristic of this hypothetical conflict must be pointed out at once. It is not a physical battle, for the patients do not present bodily symptoms. The sufferer from compulsions is harrowed by purely subjective woes and rarely presents anything more like physiological disturbance than stammering. (I can recall only two cases of compulsive thinking in which there were physical complaints and in both of these the whole clinical picture was singularly confused.) If the struggle be carried out on the mental plane, in terms of fantasies, this would naturally be a stimulus for intellectual activity—an activity that would have compulsive force, if the issue meant life or death.

To elaborate this hypothesis logically we must look for some conjunction of circumstances in childhood that would make such a strange conflict probable. This might be found in a marked discrepancy between the behaviour of the most-loved object and the characteristics assigned to this object in imagination. In other words it would be a sharp contrast between the characters of the real object and of the Imago. Before describing this situation further I must try to make clear just what I mean by the Imago and how it comes into being.

There appears in the analysis of psycho-neurotics and in the reconstruction of the delusions in the psychogenic psychoses a central theme occurring with extraordinary consistency. This is the Oedipus complex, which is an attachment to the parent of the opposite sex, expressed in the unconscious as a lust for complete and jealously exclusive possession,

so sexually coloured as to justify its description as incestuous. It is not difficult to account for the origin, repression and unconscious growth of this complex, if one is willing to assume that there is affection in the child for the parent showing him greatest tenderness and that the rudimentary sexual impulses of the child tend to follow the direction of existent emotional contact. This is an adequate explanation in nine cases out of ten, but the trouble is that ten cases out of ten seem to show it and in the tenth case the mother[1] has never been affectionate and may even have been consistently forbidding or harsh in her attitude towards her child. Moreover careful histories may fail to reveal evidence for the child ever having shown affection for his mother, or the latter may have died shortly after the birth of the boy. Yet under all these circumstances the unconscious seems to contain this same Oedipus complex. It appears as if this were some innate tendency that developed as inevitably as learning to walk. A facile explanation is that it is an inherited and universal human characteristic. This view has been put forward by Jung and accepted by many, but it implies too much modification of current biological theory to be adopted lightly.

I have elsewhere[2] outlined a scheme of development which avoids the embarrassments of Jung's theory and yet covers the clinical facts—indeed explains some otherwise puzzling ones. Briefly, this reconstruction makes the formation of the Oedipus complex the work of fantasy. We assume merely that the young child is subject to the stirrings towards affectionate human contact that are potentially sexual as they are potentially social. Their exact nature may be a matter of endless futile debate, but at least we are safe in assuming that it is their potentially sexual character which complicates their development. These stirrings tend inevitably to be focussed on the person who shows most tenderness to the child. In the upper classes of society this is probably most often a nurse. Interest in this object is first expressed in a purely automatic, instinctive way. That is, the reaction appears when the object is there to stimulate it and its absence causes nothing more than vague unrest. The child is unhappy but does not know what it wants. When consciousness develops two things happen. First, the child is now able to formulate its lack, it knows what it wants, it has some *idea* of the loved object. Second, together with consciousness, repression begins and the sexual potentialities of the union with the loved one are repressed. An unconscious is

[1] Or father in the case of the girl. Throughout this paper I shall use the mother-son relationship exclusively, but merely as a matter of convenience.

[2] *Problems in Dynamic Psychology*, p. 294 *seq.*

formed in which elaboration of the projected union can proceed untrammelled by the impediments of ethical and expedient considerations.

Our chief interest is now in the development of the idea of the loved one. It has appeared, as we have seen, to give expression to appetitive stirrings which cannot gain immediate and real outlet. Fundamentally, therefore, this idea formulates what is wanted rather than what is had. It begins as an image, or a group of images, of the real loved one, but soon it includes representations of all those who actually stand in the same tender relationship. The most central figure in this series is the mother, no matter whether she is really affectionate or ought to be, just like the other little boys' mothers are. To this composite image having the name of 'Mother' we give the title Imago. It is to the Imago that the unconscious Oedipus strivings go out.

But how about the real expressions of affection? Originally the elements of the Imago are simple duplications of the characteristics of her who has given real satisfaction. If satisfaction be always obtained in real life, the Imago will continue to represent reality. This is, however, a condition of impossible perfection. No mother, no nurse, can fulfil the demands of an exigent child for ever. So, even under the most favourable circumstances, reality will fail to measure up to the standard of the Imago. When reality is inadequate, fantasy takes its place; that is, the Imago gets and gives the surplus lust or affection which is not expressed in reality. This implies a consequent inflation, a further growth, of the Imago. The less satisfactory is actuality, the greater will be the sway of the Imago. This point is of paramount importance.

At the same time another development is taking place. On the heels of consciousness, and amplifying, reinforcing it, comes self-consciousness. Primordial fantasies are probably intensely subjective, that is, the child feels himself to be in actual contact with what he imagines, he wishes himself into situations that are pleasurable—he hallucinates his outlet. But the 'prison shades' of reality soon force another type of thinking. Once he has learned the difference between an image and a real perception he can no longer imagine the desired is actually present; he can only imagine himself in the presence of what he longs for. A self is thus built up that can do the things and be in the places which are inaccessible in fact. This is the entity which Freud has termed the 'Ich-Ideal.' The relationship of this idealized self to the real child is of exactly the same order as the relationship of the Imago to the real object of love. If the child be successful his imaginations will merely duplicate his actual achievements. But if reality thwarts him he will compensate

by building up a superman who can achieve the impossible. It is at this point, of course, that Adler's doctrine of inferiority comes in—but only here and only in the way I have just outlined, I suspect. We arrive then at a notion of two Imagos, one of self and one of the loved object, and each of them so constituted as to compensate for the disappointments of real life.

The next question is that of the relationship between these two. For two reasons there tends to be an identification of them. In the first place, as Burrow has pointed out[1], we begin life in a state of organic union with the mother, pass from that into a stage of rudimentary mental activity in which a primary subjectivity probably includes mother and child as one, and, as true objective consciousness and adaptation to reality develop, we tend regressively to cling to the notion of identification as the fundamental expression and state of love. There is then this strong urge to identification which would operate all the more readily in the case of these two Imagos since they are built of fancy and immune to the assaults of reality. Just as a well-loved child will model his character on that of the affectionate parent, so the imaginary object of love will be modelled on the ambitions of the idealized self. The second reason for identification of the two Imagos is found in the nature of the situations which lead to their formation and elaboration. If unhappiness in the child is fundamentally owing to his lack of personal emotional outlet, both Imagos are manufactured to satisfy the same need and are therefore as similar as the two halves of a circle. If unhappiness is caused by inadequacy in non-social endeavours, the object Imago will at least be the sort of person to appreciate the exploits of the magical hero. This means that he is eternally united in fancy to a mate of similar tastes.

So far I have sketched a development that probably takes place in all of us, although it has been indicated that there is room for wide variations between moderation and extravagance in the features of the Imago. We must now trace the further development of this system of fantasy, for naturally it evolves with progressive mental and physical growth. The normal type we must, unfortunately, dismiss in a few words. As Freud has said with his uncanny insight, it is the mother that teaches the boy to love. A fuller meaning to this aphorism is now evident. If the mother gives the child what he needs emotionally, the Imago will continue to be built essentially in imitation of the real mother and he will learn how to express his social instincts in everyday life. As he leaves

[1] For a digest of Burrow's theories see *Problems in Dynamic Psychology*, Part III.

the nursery the Imago will function only to direct his taste in friends, who in turn will contribute to the further characterization of the Imago. In other words the normal individual uses his Imago only in the construction of a love-type, a vision of the Perfect Mate, always a little beyond the grasp perhaps, but, nevertheless, always approachable.

It is the object of this paper to discuss the complications which ensue on there being a gross disparity in character between the real mother and the mother Imago. But first some note must be taken of the kind of factors which produce this disparity. Perhaps the commonest rests essentially with the mother herself. She does not want the child, does not love it and does not understand it: in a word, she neglects it. This may be a primary defect in the mother or it may appear with the birth of a second child. For mental growth a child demands love as it needs milk for the growth of its body. If love be not offered, it will be manufactured; and here we see the Imago as a compensation in its purest culture.

In a second group the mother is willing enough but incapable of understanding and sympathizing with the child's outlook. To what extent an inherited temperamental peculiarity of the child may be responsible for this, it is difficult to say. Temperament is so much a product of just the kind of environmental factors which we are now considering, that it is a risky business to assume its inheritance lightly, although the newborn certainly do exhibit marked variations in character. At any rate there can be no question about the inheritance of basic intelligence. Stupid mothers do give birth to clever children. It is not enough, however, for the guardian of the child to be intellectually inferior; otherwise the faithful coloured nurse would be responsible for a deal of woe. It is the dull parent who tries to 'understand' the child, who tries to substitute reason for instinct, who succeeds in totally misunderstanding and affronting her offspring. The clever child may not be able to formulate his arguments in words but he can feel illogicality—when it is directed towards himself—and he is desolated thereby. Further, it should be remembered, the more intelligent a child the greater will be his capacity for fantasy-building. In a third subtype of this group the parent is a foreigner not adapted to the new country and constantly at odds with it and all its representatives including the members of the family. In one of my cases, for instance, the mother was a German who clung grimly to the social and domestic outlook of her fathers. The result was that she succeeded in making herself into a stranger, even in her own home. This was admitted by her husband, who saw his children turn, one after another, against her.

The third group would probably rank with the first in importance. In these cases the child is devoted to a nurse who has rather exclusive contact with him and about whom he builds up his Imago. Then she leaves and the next nurse or the mother who tries to take her place cannot fill the rôle. This was the apparent origin of the woes of one of my most interesting patients. The patient was a Jew and his nurse was English. She left when he was four years of age and from then on there was a long series of illnesses and a dramatic neurosis. Ambivalent reactions towards his family were prominent; he craved affection but when his parents offered it to him he felt degraded, as if he were somehow unfaithful. The unfaithfulness he associated with his work and believed —or rather felt—that it would suffer if he gave or accepted any tokens of affection. It was only when in his teens that he learned that he was a Jew. He became violently anti-Semitic and for years treasured the fantasy that his mother was a Christian. In a characteristic dream he represented her as distorting his character, then offered her a kind of cake which made him sick and ended with reviling her venomously. Consciously he admired her and craved her affection, although regarding this as a weakness; at the same time he felt—he knew not why—all the animosity expressed in the dream. Truly his state was pitiable.

Such are the circumstances in which a gross disparity between the characters of the real mother and the Imago may develop. It will be remarked that they are not highly unusual conditions. From this one should not conclude, however, that whenever these factors are present a neurosis will result. They will undoubtedly affect the character of the individual, but the 'normal' person has a surprising way of surmounting his difficulties. His make-up is elastic; if his mother, sister, or nurse fails to represent his Imago adequately he will keep searching till he finds someone who will. The neurotic lacks this type of energy: he sits where he is and exaggerates his evil lot by spinning a further web of fantasies about himself.

We are at last in a position to consider the fate of the child who has built up this fantastic world in opposition to reality and who can find only a caricature of his loved one to play the major rôle. It must be remembered that love of self as well as object love is tied up in this system. Without these loves there is no life worthy of the name. Small wonder, then, that self-preservation urges the maintenance of his Imagos. Their destruction is, for the child who lives in such a universe, destruction of his very self. Emotional adaptation to reality spells dissolution of his system, so he hardens himself against human influence

and becomes peculiarly stubborn. As time goes on and his capacities grow, his opinions, his attitudes, his theories of life—in fact all that makes up his personality—are added to, and swallowed by, his Imago system. This makes the inviolable personality, the ideal of self which to alter is to shatter. From its first beginnings until its end a suggestion of change, that is not mere aggrandizement of what was already present, is the signal for panic. It is this panic, I believe, which provides the curious phenomenon of compulsion. It is a blind hitting out to save one's life.

The Imagos are, then, in danger; but from what quarter will the attack come? Obviously from the one who is trying to take a place not belonging to her in the system. That is, the real mother, or whoever usurps the place of the mother Imago, becomes an enemy. This woman must be destroyed else the Imago system identified with self will be destroyed. Thus sadism appears, or rather, sadism becomes the natural expression of feeling for the mother. Now the power of the child to do his mother grievous, or deadly, bodily harm is quite limited. He may attempt it in a tantrum, it is true, but his impotence is soon borne in upon him. He has to admit it. The natural recourse is to fantasies of destruction or to conduct designed to hurt her feelings rather than her body. The latter may produce a child who seems possessed of an evil spirit, while the former leads into a compulsive brooding that we shall be considering shortly. Sadism is established as a reaction of choice.

I am here using the term sadism, not loosely as a synonym for cruelty, but advisedly. Sadism is a form of erotic outlet. One might ask why a person, so far described as purely an enemy, should excite any feelings except animosity. The answer is that the child needs protection, he craves affection from real people as he craves real food. In the situation which produces a pathological outcome, there is no one else to whom he may turn for this but the mother, hated though she may be. To maintain his Imago he must destroy his mother; to nourish his real erotism he must have physical contact with the creature. The answer is a combination of the two impulses, that is, sadism. Pain, then, becomes the medium of exchange for erotic interest, it can be both inflicted and received. Masochism is thus as inevitable as sadism. In the Jewish patient mentioned above masochism was prominent. After the departure of his adored nurse, he had apparently violent pains in his legs for eighteen months. These could only be assuaged by his mother rubbing and anointing his aching limbs. Throughout his childhood and on into adolescence his fantasy of sexual intercourse was of some

queer kind of mutual spanking. This reappeared in his dreams as an adult.

Now, in so far as the child yields to his needs for real affection and establishes contact with his mother, to that extent is he unfaithful to his Imago and tends to weaken it. To compensate for this he develops two symptoms. First he has a feeling of shame for indulgence in any expression or reception of love and develops a curious ethical hero, the man who can live untouched by emotion. On the other hand he works to strengthen the Imago system, to maintain and enlarge his sense of self. This can only be done in fantasy, that is, by thinking. In the normal individual fantasy tends to lapse as real satisfactions are more and more accessible. Such a person uses his thinking to adapt himself to discrete and consciously realized situations. Thinking, *qua* thinking, has no meaning for him. But with the type we are now considering it is different. The person, who must build fantasies or see all he holds dearest and his very self perish, will build his fantasies in a frenzy. These fantasies with the normal growth of experience, as the ideal of self enlarges, become less fantastic and more intellectual. But they remain compulsive: he thinks "as if his life depended on it." As time goes on this complex of tendencies sinks into the unconscious, but it does not lapse nor is the nexus loosed. Any problem in which there is any interest at all becomes an object for unconscious preoccupation. It *must* be solved, for, unconsciously now, it means the overthrow of the enemy and the salvation of self. Naturally such a person develops his intellectual potentialities as his more normal neighbour does not. He belongs, only temperamentally of course, to the genius type. That is he works on his problems unconsciously, feverishly, and the solution comes like an inspiration. If this lust for thinking be joined with real intelligence the capacity for creation may be large, amounting, perhaps, to true genius. It is combined with such a potentiality for abnormality, however, that its effectiveness is often blocked by neurosis.

The compulsive thinking then becomes conscious rather than unconscious, inducing a train of symptoms which we must now examine. As has been pointed out earlier the creative thinker sticks tenaciously to the idea of solution. The postponement of satisfaction, which this implies, requires a considerable capacity for sublimation. If adaptation fails—and it is always likely to do so in a person with a rigid personality—regression ensues. The unconscious then puts forward a demand for more immediate satisfaction: solutions of the vital problem of life no longer have to conform to the standards attained by the conscious,

adult ideal of self, but are judged by the values which obtained at the period of original conflict. Hence the extraordinary, infantile crudity which compulsive ideas may portray. For instance, I had one patient who was plagued by the thought that any bit of meat she saw was flesh from her father's body; this she felt compelled to bite and chew, although, of course, she never did so and nearly starved herself in consequence. Since she was a cook, her duties involved her handling meat daily, which aggravated her torture. (I suspect that rebellion against her lot contributed to the motivation of her symptom which, from one angle, was an occupation neurosis.)

All compulsive thoughts have not this crudity and simplicity. Sometimes they are repetitious memories or elaborate fantasies, complicating the clinical picture of another neurosis, or vexing an otherwise healthy man. All of them, however, seem to have either a manifest sadistic colouring or present this on the most superficial analysis. The very kernel of our problem lies in the inability of the patient to disregard these thoughts when they come. Normal people can do so and they achieve it even when the ideas in question have a strong unconscious backing. They do so in two ways. Attention is voluntarily turned to other interests and this is done after criticism has demonstrated the baselessness or futility of the idea. The compulsive neurotics seem unable to do either. The exercise of conscious intelligence or of will-power is not impossible in other, neutral, situations so we must conclude that there is no fundamental disease of consciousness or will. We must look for the disease in those activities for which consciousness and will are but tools.

Will we can regard for our present purposes as a control of attention. Consciousness is the faculty which correlates the thoughts and reactions arising spontaneously or from within with those stimulated by the environment. Both of these serve and express the personality. Now the peculiarity of the personality of the compulsive thinker lies in its rigidity. It must suffer no change from external pressure and any threat of this is a signal for rage or panic or both. So long as he is well, the compulsive neurotic has a strong will: obstacles stimulate him to a stubborn overcoming of them. Similarly his consciousness works efficiently to criticize, disregard and eliminate all perceptions, thoughts or impulses not consonant with the motives of the personality. On the other hand, if these weapons seem to fail, the reaction is one of panic. No compulsive neurotic can accept his weaknesses of failures philosophically. They are interpreted, emotionally, as if they spelled certain and complete ruin.

This enables us to understand the sequence of events when regression takes place. In the course of adaptive development through more and more refined sublimations the ideal of self has attained a system of socialized behaviour and standards quite different from, perhaps opposite to, the primitive ambitions with which the personality began and which are now reappearing. The self as consciously conceived seems to be disintegrating and panic results. This panic paralyses the intellectual processes—which is not unnatural, for a breakdown of rationality is what differentiates panic from fear. The patient is always nonplussed when compulsive thoughts emerge; and he cannot scrutinize his mental processes efficiently because he cannot do so calmly. The situation is not unlike that seen in the anxiety states of war. The meaning of the symptoms resides, frequently, in an association of ideas that is quite capable of becoming conscious as it is under no particularly vigorous repression. But the symptom defies criticism because it has produced a paralysing fear. Many of these patients made phenomenally speedy recoveries when forced to recall the setting in which the symptoms began.

To understand the failure of voluntary control of attention from which the compulsive neurotic suffers we must bear in mind that the will is a function of the personality and consider what the personality is. It is an integration of reaction tendencies, of appetites, and complicated interests, motives, so combined as to have a unity which establishes the individuality of its possessor. In the compulsive neurotic, factors which we have discussed caused the personality to be viewed as peculiarly sacred. But we must remember that this devotion is not given to whatever integration of motives happens to be operating at any given moment, but rather to a fantastically immutable abstraction set up as Self. The subjective and the objective personalities may then be different; if regression is marked the difference will be great, for the motives will be of a much more primitive order. The actual self, that is the objective personality, may then have different interests and direct attention in the service of ambitions to which regression has given ascendancy. The "will" of a more primitive creature is operating and it may be doing so with all the stubbornness characteristic of this neurotic type. Subjectively, meanwhile, the patient seems to have lost his will-power; and indeed he has, for will is, properly speaking, always a conscious affair.

One more symptom deserves attention. This is what has been known among psycho-analysts as the magical thoughts of the compulsive neurotic. He feels and acts in a superstitious way about his pathological ideas. If, for instance, an impulse to injure some one be a symptom,

whenever this impulse appears in consciousness, the patient feels as if his merely thinking of it had actually injured the fancied victim. To prevent or undo the harm, he may go through an elaborate or painstaking ritual and, until he has performed these rites, he knows no comfort. If we are to analyse this phenomenon accurately, we must bear in mind that the potency of mere thoughts is an emotional, not an intellectual, conviction. That is, the patient knows all the time that his behaviour is ridiculous. The moment such insight ceases the clinical condition changes and the compulsions have become delusions. The essence of this affect is an excessive feeling of reality for his thoughts.

The symptom of excessive reality feeling is the reverse, psychologically, of the painful feeling of unreality from which some depressed individuals suffer. In the latter there is the same accuracy of judgment of reality, but both perceptions and thoughts seem unreal. The grass, they say, does not look as green as it should, although they know other people see it green enough. This peculiar symptom, when analysed in conjunction with attendant ones, is seen to be an expression of a general paucity of emotional reaction that is spread wholesale over all mental life. Without an emotional penumbra all sensory and subjective experience loses its normal vividness; it is seen through a mirror, darkly; it is phantasmal, unreal. The explanation of this symptom may help us with that of the magical thinking.

Unreality-feeling seems to be a product of the general, wholesale repression operating in depressions. If, as I believe, subjective feeling or affect is the reflection in consciousness of reverberating unconscious associations, then sufficient repression would cut off all this unconscious activity, leaving the patient without feeling and pursuing an arduous way in artificially forced adaptations, motivated from the conscious levels of the personality rather than from the unconscious. This is the kind of life which such patients describe. Now the magical thought is something that has escaped repression and emerges in consciousness as the representative of a vast system of impulses still unconscious. The very compulsiveness of the idea shows what a backing it has. Unconsciously the whole Imago system has sprung to arms ready for a life and death struggle. All this unconscious activity is focused on the compulsive thought which gives it an extreme emotional vividness, an excessive feeling of reality. It feels as if the idea must be true or the impulse potent.

This principle was well demonstrated in a patient of mine whose attacks began with compulsions, that passed over into delusions with

deep depression, and culminated in a somnambulism in which the whole unconscious story was retailed without let or hindrance. In brief the symptoms and their development were as follows. Her compulsions were twofold, to kill some baby or babies and to look for her baby. (She was a childless, unmarried woman). After a few weeks in which she was harrowed by the conviction that she would murder a baby and was unable to dispel the ridiculous notion of her having a baby of her own, these compulsive thoughts became delusions: she had murdered the babies (she hallucinated their mangled bodies) and she had a baby, for which she would go searching. This led to fugues. Finally she dissociated so far as to go into a deep somnambulism in which I examined her. The explanation of all her symptoms then appeared. At the age of two a brother was born who came between her father and herself. She protested—this was all recited in the present tense—that she must have the baby as a child of herself and her father, or she would kill it. I have omitted many other unconscious memories from that period of her life and, indeed, many symptoms. But an extended study of her case showed this reconstruction of the family with elimination of her mother to be the nucleus around which a tremendous number of fantasies were built. Much evidence was also accumulated to indicate that when these two compulsive ideas appeared the whole system was activated unconsciously. It was this unconscious system which urged the compulsions on, which gave them their emotional vividness and "reality" and which made them magical thoughts.

I have already mentioned the great stumblingblock to treatment which the rigidity of personality in the compulsive neurotic presents. They have insight for their symptoms but none for defects of character; nay further, they are unwilling even to discuss such defects. This point need not be laboured further. But it should be pointed out that this complication in treatment is not confined to the compulsion neurosis. It occurs whenever symptoms become integrated with the personality. Such union is particularly liable to occur in invalidism, when the patient actually gains something from his symptoms. One example of this is, perhaps, worth citing. The patient was a woman who had suffered for eight years with a facial neuralgia, the behaviour of which showed it to be neurotic. During these years she had spent all her money on doctors and had become dependent on friends, one of the "brave sufferers" with whom we are all familiar. Analysis was attempted. She accepted placidly the usual Oedipus and lurid autoerotic interpretations and actually began to show some improvement. Then I suggested that

it was time she got a job and earned a little money. As this was accepted without enthusiasm I ventured most inconsiderately to remind her that she was not paying me for her treatment. At this she exploded almost literally. She had never been so insulted in her life, of course she was going to pay me, and so on. The next day came a letter enclosing a small sum of money. She wrote that she had never suffered so in her life, only her tremendous strength of character had kept her from suicide and she charged me never to say such an unfeeling thing to any patient again. I have not seen or heard of her again.

If my hypothesis about compulsive thinking be sound, it may offer some grain of hope therapeutically. So long as the personality remains rigid symptoms are bound to recur. But if the central defect of his make-up be brought home to the patient he may be able to make a virtue of it. All that is necessary—although this is a Herculean task—is for the central egoism to become engaged in the task of reconstruction. Let pride and self-preservation once be turned to the task of self-analysis and it becomes compulsively necessary for the patient to anticipate the analyst in his discoveries. I have known one such case. The patient worked as if possessed, in a frenzy to detect his complexes and to interpret them accurately. It excluded practically all other thoughts from his mind until each dream was analysed, even if this took him all day or all night. But in his endeavour he was, in the main, successful; in fact this hypothesis is largely the outcome of that analysis.

Before leaving the subject of treatment certain secondary phenomena that appear during it should be mentioned. I have already touched on the way in which the compulsive thinker will be preoccupied in his dreams with problems and the degree to which intellectual judgments will be formulated therein. The subtlety with which his dreams may make fun of the analyst is sometimes highly amusing. Another feature is the melodramatic nature of the dreams. Particularly when the diurnal symptoms are urgent, the night is full of battle, murder and sudden death. This seems quite natural if the central problem be understood as 'kill or be killed.' A third characteristic is the feeling, even passion, with which the history will be given of dissatisfaction or disillusionment with the loved one during childhood. The repetition of these often fully conscious memories is accompanied with an affect more appropriate to a present trial. The man is still bearing a grudge. There is little of the apology, "Poor mother, she did her best," but, rather, a continued bitterness. The conflict is still going on.

In conclusion let me enumerate the characteristics of the compulsive

thinker which he ought to show, according to this hypothesis and which, if demonstrated consistently in a large series of cases, ought to go a long way towards validating the theory. In the first instance there should be a history indicating a marked discrepancy between the characters of the object Imago and of the person who ought to be the representative thereof. Secondly, the personality of the patient ought to show rigidity of the type I have described. He ought to be unduly resistive to criticism and much less amenable to suggestion than is the normal man. I should be surprised to meet an individual with prominent compulsive thinking who identified himself emotionally with groups or group ideas unless he were the dominating figure in the band. In other words he could lead, or more likely drive, but he could never follow. Similarly his jealous maintenance of the idea of self would prevent his having true religious experience; or, if he did achieve this a revolutionary change of character would ensue. Marked development of compulsive thinking and the abandonment of self which true religion demands are, I believe, utterly incompatible. Finally, if treatment be undertaken and a survey of the patient's dreams be made, the symbolizing of his unconscious motivations would be found to involve an unusual amount of intellectualization.

SUMMARY.

The problem is to correlate the following phenomena in compulsive thinkers: compulsive thoughts, often of extraordinary crudity; prominence of unconscious sadism; intellectual superiority; and obduracy to treatment. The hypothesis is that there exists in early childhood a marked discrepancy between the actual behaviour and that expected from the idealized object of love (Imago). This leads to a conflict between the idealized mother (or father or their surrogates) and the idealized self, which can only be solved by the victory of one over the other. The instinct of self-preservation is attached to the ideal of self rather than to the body, and so that ideal becomes inviolate. The real object must then be destroyed in order to preserve the ideal of self and its related idealization of the object. This tends to make expression of interest in the real object take a sadistic form. But physical expression of animosity is futile in a child, so it plans the destruction of the object in fantasy. This is an intellectual operation and is carried out compulsively because the life of the Self depends upon it—it is a panic reaction. Sadism and the compulsive use of intellectual processes are thus established and intertwined. As the individual matures, the ideal of self becomes more

elaborate and socialized but remains peculiarly sacred. When failure of adaptation occurs, the unconscious sadism emerges: it shocks the personality and so the personality is not adapted to it; it comes compulsively and in relatively its original form. Treatment is difficult, not for lack of intelligence, but because there is a stubborn refusal to allow change of outlook which means change of personality; *i.e.* treatment resuscitates the old panic reaction. Insight is present only for symptoms and not for defects of character. This type of mental constitution probably occurs in many people of intellectual vigour who never develop compulsive symptoms.

A NEW APPROACH TO AN ANALYSIS OF *MARY ROSE*

(A PLAY OF SIR JAMES BARRIE)

By P. LIONEL GOITEIN.

The revival after more than five years of Sir James Barrie's most recent —and in some ways most mature—play *Mary Rose*, following close upon its publication in book form (1925), has doubtless tended to focus popular attention once again upon the interesting theme therein elaborated; and may be our excuse for examining at some length the problems it raises, the solutions it provides. Barrie in the simple but ingenuous mode of presentation he adopts will always give food for thought and cause for reflection. Perhaps those who remember the earlier newspaper correspondence, and the endless explanations of its possible meaning, offered (with more or less relevancy) by diverse critics at its first performance, will see that the play strikes a deeper chord than the average, and a dispassionate review of its theme and symbolism may not be amiss to-day.

His theme is taken from life, it is universal: but the solution of its problem is surely his own. It bears however a close comparison with one of the masterpieces of Ibsen, and that author's own solution we hope at some future date to discuss. By reason of his unique individuality, Barrie has perhaps thrown himself into his drama, identified himself with its characters, and silhouetted himself in his shadow-play more than most authors might dare, but this only lends the more life and piquancy to its unreality. When we come to dwell on the play's various aspects it is taken for granted that the entire play is well known to the reader, or even before his eyes; as space scarcely permits a rehearsal of its 'manifest story' or of liberal quotation from its store of poetic brilliance. Also it may be recalled that a brief analysis of certain features was offered in this *Journal* by the late Dr Constance Long in 1922 from a *hearing* of the play, but no attempt to explain, *e.g.* the choice of names, identification of certain characters, artifices employed, or its many obscure references, was therein made.

The Play as a Parable of Life.

So richly is the play tempered with poetry that we are inclined to miss the deep philosophy of life that, as is usual with our author, lies beneath; of this we are almost unaware. Barrie is as reticent and silent as Cameron, the Highlander, "until questioned of his views of the universe...." Woven into *Mary Rose* is the answer to our question—his enunciation of the Parable of Life.

It is spring at its *noontide* in Act I. Summer's *afternoon* in Act II. Autumn at *twilight* in Act III, and the wintry *evening* at the close[1]. All the while, "the wheezy little smith in the corner" hammers out the Time; while Youth tries to hurry it on still further.

In other words, the life in the home is seen through the march of the seasons, and the passage of the hours of day; and it symbolises the seasons of our earthly existence. For there is found: the betrothal with the spring, the joys of married life in the summer, the parting ("*one of us must go*") with autumn, and when winter arrives and has found all dead, the shadow-play is ended in a dream. Again, the Tree seen boldly standing in the garden is the shadow-dial or hour-glass of Time. It symbolises the Tree of Life; it is an apple tree. Thus, in Act I it is found laden with blossom and full of foliage; in Act II trees have yielded their berries, and this tree its apples, and the world is carpeted with thick undergrowth and is at its gayest; in Act III the leaf is seared, its apples have fallen, the tree is found smaller and only a few straggling fruits remain; and finally it must needs be cut down....Such is the story of the life of man, too. Those with the eyes to read aright, may draw their lesson from the progress of Simon, the husband of Mary Rose; from punt to fishing-boat, to *Gadfly*, to the *Valiant*, to *Britannia* and ultimately the cruiser *Bellerophon*; and watch his enviable rise in life from sailor to midshipman, to sub-lieutenant, lieutenant, captain and the greatest honour of all, a burial at sea, "when that which drew from out the boundless deep Turn again home." It is such hints as these that indicate the parable it would tell.

The Island that performs its mysterious part in the play, seems, in Act II, symbolic of the earth and our terrestrial existence....Once, during the summer that is the heyday of our sexual life, we, as "birds of passage" and "bold tourists" come for a brief spell to *visit* the island—

[1] Not to be found in stage-directions, but deduced from hints in the text. It should be noted that, unless otherwise indicated, all references in inverted commas are from the play: double = *or. recta*, single = *or. obliqua* or stage-directions.

this "miniature land"—and take refuge, so to speak, in its 'bird sanctuary' that "is so safe." It is there we make love, may mate and live in peace, and leave our offspring behind us; and our name for ever "carved" on the island-story; as we ourselves flee away to other fields and worlds beyond the stars. It is but a narrow loch that separates us from the 'greater isle' that is eternity. And when, at the close of life's visit, we turn to go, and think of our last, we are saddened at the thought. "The last time of anything is always sad," says Mary Rose, and recounts in tender pathos a hundred and one things that must be our last as death arrives, and "if one of us had to go." Or, as she beautifully phrases it, "we have to live in the present" to-day. "Alas! we go *across* to-morrow." We must cross the bar to the islands of the west, and, as Simon says, "we will *never* come back again." In the same strain is her mother's reflection, "Our lifetime...it will soon be dark...I can see the twilight running across the fields....Just a little longer and then we shall understand all." That is the touch of death, when there is 'silence' and 'stillness' on the island, 'the fire' will have 'gone out'; the 'air is chill' and into the heaving waves 'the sun (of life) has set.' That moment is death when we receive "the Call" from the Father in Heaven and answer it, and are to be found no more in the island....The play might well be re-read with this parable in mind, though the island so symbolised is but a minor aspect of the many it is called upon to assume (see later, p. 199).

The play is unique, in that the author under the cloak of a beautiful story has a personal problem to solve. His characters breathe with the suppressed sighs of his complexes, and serve as admirable masks or puppets for the interplay of rival forces within himself. So successfully is this masked that for all intents and purposes only the manifest characters are seen by the multitude. This is made possible by a clever character-study of types and individuals very true to life, and with whom the author has obviously come in contact. But beneath all this brave show, the latent content (the concealed character) still lingers; and as opportunity presents, creeps through into conscious expression; to become manifest to all with the eyes to discern and ears to detect.

Psychological Resources of the Stage Craft.

To appreciate the play's intricate development by the author, we will turn to consider the MODE OF PRESENTATION, and the artifices Barrie has found necessary to adopt; to be followed by each of the four phases of the theme in its working-out. The first striking point in its

presentation is the realism, its nearness to truth and the probability of its genuine occurrence in life. This is made possible by his adoption of a quasi-scientific attitude, and the airs of a trained detective still taking his bearings. The latter device serves to preserve the air of mystery, keep up the suspense and, although branding the incidents as unusual, does not rule them out as improbable. The former allows us to preserve our sanity of outlook and, with a certain amount of deep sincerity (and justification in modern research), can carry away its audience and blind them to the sober truth; an audience, nowadays, probably as well versed in the occult as the author himself. For the success of the last venture a tireless insistence must be made, by delicate hints throughout the play, on phenomena best known to us through study of abnormal psychology; phenomena legion in their various ramifications. At the same time, Barrie intends our attitude to be one of patient expectation, not carried away by emotional excitement. There is little that is nerve-racking in his story. But we are thus warned against suggesting "it is all make-believe," "a fairy story," "only a play" (for it is Life; perhaps life in his own home). We are expected to explain each step and action in turn; or satisfactorily explain away each incongruous element. No touch in it is accidental or artificial, it would appear; each has its own significant meaning; but the author is anxious to tell his story in his own way. He is not only anxious, but troubled, for the essential incident seems to worry him; and he, therefore, seeks as many outlets of expression as possible. For no discovery in science is left untried that can be enlisted to throw light on his theme and support his inmost contention. 'Haunting,' 'Materialisation,' Psychic research, Dreams, Hallucinations, Sublimation, Brain Waves (telepathy), and Wireless Waves, are in turn offered as explanations to justify the pet delusion.... He, therefore, falls back *e.g.* on the phenomenon of Trance and Dream, carefully preserving many of the little tricks peculiar to dream expression, best made known to us, probably, by *Alice Through the Looking Glass*; its power of skipping over time and leaving some of its images uninfluenced by time; its logic, its confusion of the characters, its sudden appearance, and its fading away. Mary Rose lives in a trance for one-third of her natural life, and is found still sleeping at the end. It is no less a day-dream where within ten short minutes the happenings of a lifetime may skip through space as Harry, the dreamer, gazes into the fire, and begins to wonder about the past. This is a stage-device and artifice that enables him (and us) to review the incidents leading up to his adoption into the family, "things he never knew about" and events subsequent to his flight, and

would account for Barrie's custom of viewing things "just as if" they meant something different. For it is all 'make-believe' in the dream: and a sample of this characteristic touch may, perhaps, illustrate it best. Most commonly "*as if*" heralds the approach of Mary Rose.

It is as if Mary Rose were just something beautiful.
Just as if I never had a girl (Mary Rose) myself.
As if...as if a cold finger had touched my Mary Rose.
I give...pompous decisions...as if nothing had happened to me (over Mary Rose).
As if struck while in full flight (from her island).
It might have been Mary Rose.
It is just (as if) that the island had faded from her memory.
Mary Rose returns as if made out of the light.
As if there were two kinds of dogs out hunting (Mary Rose).
(Her island)...sounds as if it might be heaven.
Like as if He had forgotten (Mary Rose).
As if nobody wanted (Mary Rose)...here or there.
A star...as if it were her star, sent for her.

In addition we find an abundance of 'if' and 'ifs.' Mary Rose is introduced to us with an 'if.'

Should we reject this, he offers us the device of a vivid veridical hallucination, for Harry is certain he "*wasn't sleeping, it's no dream, but things came crowding out of their holes,—I saw them all so clear—and gathered round me*"..."*made them come to me as I sat here.*" There is also Mary Rose's hallucination "of the little old woman on the stairs"; and, when on the island, of her baby waving his bib—("*You needn't pretend you can see him*"). Indeed...she has been seen "talking to some person who wasn't there and listening as it were for some sound that never came." The possibility that Mary Rose is herself an hallucinatory figure in the house, and is seen by all, could be explained by the recognised phenomenon of a 'collective hallucination'; so also her rapid disappearance and reappearance, and that "we cannot see her quite so clearly."

Space forbids reference in support of all the artifices we enumerated above. But in a different category from the dream and without its limitations is offered the further device—deftly handled and most delicately and realistically conceived—the creation of a ghost and the working up of the atmosphere of a haunted house. Mary Rose as a *ghost* is a little more conceivable to the imagination. In her presence we have at once all the classical requirements of that being, and recognise her as an old friend and feel quite at home. In this presentation, we are informed at the outset that an unknown ghost of a young woman noiselessly stalks the cold room of an ancient and haunted manor house; at midnight—searching, searching for we know not what. Tenants have

left in a hurry, for she is in no wise a harmless ghost. Caretakers have fled from her unwelcome attentions and even the present one, leaving her severely alone in the one room she loves to haunt, is a scared woman and has been known to run out into the fields and stay there trembling half the night (Act I). At the close of the third act, her form becomes manifest to all and her quivering child-like voice reveals what mental torment she endures. For, as you know, "*They are unhappy because they can't find something, and then once they've got the thing they want, they go away happy and never come back.*" If Mary Rose can be so realistic a ghost and she is even "dressed as you and me," it might be that when the house is revealing its past, *all* the characters are intended as so many ghosts rising from "their holes," and living before us; and "*they* cunningly set again at that never-ending search which goes on in some old houses."

If it were so intended by Barrie thus to soften the play's emotional stirrings by sinking them in the pallid substance of a dream and story, it in no wise detracts from its real significance as a living drama. But in this way he can spare its reality being pondered over, and leaves our emotions all unruffled and our imagination and logic unstrained. In a way, Barrie intended our emotions to be ruffled and moved even as were his own that found outlet in this theme. The most we can concede of such a mode of expression is that the play contains one dream figure, Mary Rose, "a curious phantom form"..."*perhaps a little indistinct,*" half human, and half dream, the indefinite figure Barrie so loves to paint, amid the lucid characters of our everyday life.

THE REAL ILLUSION OF ACT I. *The Journey to the Hearth.*

With this artifice made plain to us, Barrie shows us into the happenings of a past—his past—thirty years ago, and asks us to follow him into the house where he was born and permits us to peep, as ever, into the secrets of his personal life. Our sketch of the essential theme will have given this much clue, and the facts in so far as they throw light on this play, will be referred to subsequently (p. 201 ff.). Let us see in what way the method he adopts is peculiar. As we sit as an audience we are witnessing the beautiful illusion that in going back to the "Home" and its "little room" we are going back to the Mother. Such metaphorical language is common enough in poetic literature; but more extraordinary than this—we are having events described from within, both figuratively and anatomically. Each one of us is carried back to the place whence we came, for the author conducts us back with him.

He permits us to live in the "baby's room," "the mother's room" and to wander at ease over the house. He pauses at every prominence in its architecture to show how like the human it is, and ultimately how the whole fabric is but the noble figure of a Woman.

For the house and its rooms, more especially the Mother's Room (such as Hudson dwells on in detail in *Crystal Age*) is the mother of the family. It wears "her disturbing smile," 'the smiles that she has left about'; and its aspect "takes on a semblance of herself"; even as every room is "full of herself, hanging on nails and folded away in drawers." We are privileged to see a Vision of life "in the old manner" (old manor) in the confines of the old-time mother. Small wonder they "whisper and thrill at his coming." Our attention is focused first on the garden external to her, with a blossoming tree at the open window, whose foliage scrapes the glass. This leads to a big room and (with-)drawing room, where the baby first learnt to swim; and by a 'fearsome narrow dark passage' into a single room—the baby's room "where he used to sleep"—the oldest part of the mother. It has two windows of stone and spanned above with wooden rafters; the door is never locked, it is often held, but the key is lost (only the grim blade—"the visiting card"—is to be thrust against its door). It is here that the ghost-mother pauses, hunting still for her child. Down below is the kitchen with its well-known smells (and rat holes) and the front door. Over our head and "so near us" is the Apple-room so called (?) from the large apples pressing against its walls. It is gloomy within—a chamber from which the *thumping* on the floor can be heard, and man may cry in secret in the recesses of his heart; now and then to be answered by a thump quicker and happier from the big room below "when things are getting on, and going well." As we trace our way outward we observe a picture of a "water-fall" on the wall of the (with-)drawing room. Its "window opens outward" and it was down the parent trunk of the foliaged tree that her baby "slipped away" into the garden....

The Real Illusion of Act II. *The Journey to the Mind.*

The author is rightly determined that we should see his complete hallucination in the making, watch the mechanism and gaze on its gradual elaboration up to its final perfection: and that is the *birth* of the *image* of his heroine. He has taken us through her birth-chamber physically in the home, Act I, whose maternal architecture we have sketched above; ours is a view from within. His next care is to take us into his *mind* and watch the mental counterpart of the same erection—

the birth of a living idea and a creating of the phantasy figure, but we must view it from without. The journey to the mind is Act II. It proves to be a dreamy, misty figure of an island: a little world that creates its phantoms "in the image of their maker," a "miniature land" of reveries and phantasies—the island of the Unconscious. Thus, "it is not always there" and when not under the full focus of consciousness ("the sun" that plays "hide and seek with it"), the Island, like our attention, wanders "and goes for a jaunt," there in the north, the misty Hebrides. If that island is the mind, it is there that Mary Rose was created and into its substance is suddenly 'called' back, lost and all forgotten like some frail phantom of a dream in the glaring light of day. (It will be fully discussed later, p. 199.)

Coming back to reality from out the shadows, we are invited to listen to our author's presentation of his theme in some of its different phases. For the plain man, perhaps a little undiscerning, oblivious of ghosts and not particularly interested in dreams, comes the story of an Individual Life which might be detailed somewhat as follows:

The Latent Content of the Play (one aspect).

It is thirty years ago. In an isolated old manor house on the Sussex downs, lives a middle-aged, affluent J.P., James Morland. He is a squire, a good shot and interested generally in sport, but with a passion for drawings and rare prints which he collects on occasional visits to London. Fanny, his wife, is an amiable, affectionate, motherly soul who well understands him, and the two seem happily married, but childless. They see few people, but an agreeable diversion is the local parson (Mr George Amy), himself a horseman, 'sport' and print collector, of the same age. His wife we never see. Mr Morland is an impressionable man and his reflections and attitude to life are moulded on the sport he indulges in, the scenes he has passed through, and the curious appeal of the old house in which he lives. The couple have conceived the idea of bestowing their parental longings on an adopted child, a sailor; twenty-three years old when the story opens, Simon Blake[1]. [And a little later comes a further adoption of a boy of 2¾ yr. for Simon's pleasure: but as he is mostly away at sea, the child lives in the home and care of the *soi-disant* Grandfather.] While the squire has been watching the first grow to manhood, he has long secretly cherished the idea of a young daughter of his dreams having come to life out of the 'misty land of reverie.' She is to live with him and be in all respects a member of his house, whose barren interior he so regrets, and is, as he promises himself, to be the life spouse of his adopted boy. She is not Mary Morland, but Mary Rose, a blossoming flower; and so is she called throughout the play. Mary is sufficiently real a Galatea to be the beloved plaything of father, mother and 'son'; but is left sadly to remind us of her illusory nature by fading suddenly from sight and memory when the focus of attention and concentration upon her, necessary for existence, fails. For twice in his lifetime Morland forgets his beautiful illusion—in his youth for three weeks, and in middle-age for a third of his life—and comes to realise what a miserable affair life becomes without a daughter. For all this time she has become lost within the

[1] The assumption that he is adopted is dealt with, p. 190. Each of the other surmises has direct support in the play, when it is carefully studied, and we will refrain from a mass of quotations here.

substance of an island beyond the mists—a beautiful miniature world that, like her, is ephemeral; and after all, only a land of shadow, an image of the mind. These three (mother, father and son) alone then are real amid that dreamy play of life of which she, radiating sunshine, in all her innocent girlish perfection, was once the centre figure....Thus Morland turns his mind to other things, hunting, judicial decisions, and collecting drawings (which he fondly imagines might be his daughter's, and are preserved in a drawer) until, with old age, she is successfully forgotten. Just before the old man dies, when perhaps he is too old to cherish the delusion longer she, like other forgotten things of childhood, comes back to mind. Yes, unexpectedly returns, and amid all things aged, she alone is young; and her image seems 'to possess the home.' So much so, that when the old inmates die, the story gains credence among the superstitious villagers that her likeness (her ghost) haunts the old house still; which, in her presence, wears the quiet "disturbing smile of the Monna Lisa's, which came surely of her knowing what only the dead should know." And so it happens that when Simon's adopted child (now grown to manhood) comes home from the wars, and from a country where the "Angels of Mons," the spirit of Jean d'Arc, and visions of the Madonna are common hallucinations, he picks up the local mysterious gossip, and on entering the old house late at night, seems to see the curious ghost again, with the manner of a little girl he might wish for as his child.

The Latent Content. *In the Guise of a Sacred Drama.*

Moving away next from this simple story, we must allow ourselves to ascend to a higher plane, and see what greater drama and bigger lesson Barrie has in store for us. It has been shown (p. 179), that it is in part a parable of life. It is more—*Mary Rose* is a mystery play, a religious drama. Without claiming for a moment that this is the secret of the whole play, we are surely right in assuming that such is its essence; and that the intention of the author, in the presentation he adopts, is to place the characters on a high spiritual level, out of the way of normal men and above the petty incidents just recorded. The scene is laid in Heaven and Earth; it is a sacred drama, and the characters are the Virgin Mary, Simon the fisher, the Father in Heaven and (more indistinctly) the Child of the Virgin, or perhaps, in this case, the Prodigal Son; and in the background of little opportunities here, the Holy Ghost in its maternal significance....The story has as its prologue:

"There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy. ...You and I know that to be true."...And its moral is to propound and "to justify the ways of God to men."

The island from which Virgin Mary (the Rose) voluntarily falls—her single lapse, which "should be overlooked by now"—is that "glory place" the island of Paradise and Heaven[1]. Her father is now in heaven (Heavenly Father); He is her Creator and she is formed in His own (mental) image; but she is left to remain a ghost—for she is shut out of His thoughts and forgotten—remain a ghost till the Master Creator draws her back into His heaven, into His mind. Indeed, as the last

[1] *Vide*, p. 202, Island-symbol.

curtain falls, and the last (trumpet)-'call' is heard, amid a night of stars, the ascension of the Virgin into heaven takes place peacefully before our eyes. Meanwhile, in the brief space she is shut out of eternity, Mary has come to earth. In reality, Mary has not so much come down but sprung up from earth (for the Kingdom of Heaven is upon earth), albeit in an island in the mists beyond our ken. It would seem that *Mary rose from the deep*, "that which drew from out the boundless deep" —a Lady from the Sea; and has scrambled on to earth, languishing on dry land, 'out of her element,' where "*the sound of the sea is not heard at all.*" She thus makes this one appearance on earth to have the problem of eternity once and for all solved before our eyes, no less than the personal problem of the author. The solution is, of necessity, an individual one and his own, with the final lesson "unless ye be like little children, ye cannot enter the kingdom." Then her spirit (ghost) is "laid" to rest for ever, and the island amid the stars reclaims its erring child.

What is the problem Mary Rose really endeavours to settle when she comes to earth? It is stated in the play as the question of eternity which is, of course, 'How can man live for ever, how reclaim his lost youth and be born again, how come to be a little child once more to enter the kingdom of heaven?' Or, expressed in the 'projected' form, "What is it Mary is ever searching for and longing for, and returned for?—a baby." Indeed she goes through a "*nightly travail that can never be completed*" till this Harry is here "*to provide the end.*" Now the latent content of this question is the personal heart-searching: "How can a man tear himself away from the mother, and yet be one with her...?" Mary herself is eternal, always virgin, ever young. She has solved the problem, but she is of another world, from which 'the loch' and the 'vale of the shadow' separate us. ("There was a door for which I had no key; There was a veil past which I could not see.") How is it with us? We cannot be Peter Pans, that is certain; reverie and dream are not enough, if as men we would live again we must recreate ourselves; go back to the womb whence we came—and this must mean reunion with the mother. Or man may create himself by 'being one with' his own grandchild—by union with his daughter. Of course, this is but deep, unconscious reasoning; in life it is but metaphor, it satisfies the mind's censor in the guise of religious drama; and on the stage it is but the enacting of a dream; and so again may pass the world's censorship. Now it is the peculiar solution of the play and the unique formula of Barrie, as distinct from Ibsen, that the former phantasy is to be openly

rejected. Man for him does not seek union with the mother, and his answer to the immortality problem is "*Through* the creation of a daughter," *i.e.* that the immaculate conception of the virgin by the spirit of the Father in heaven—a sound into her ear ("Quae per aurem concupisti" says a hymn) or the visit of a bird, is alone the righteous course: the union of the Father with the daughter and the rise of the Immortal Son and Lord. Simon the fisher (like Joseph) may be the mortal consort of the Virgin, but he never has lien of her. He makes love to her; the sparks of the fire he has made 'leap up as often as they are trampled down,' but as he approaches her, "an unholy organ" of another "increasing in volume" rakes the bushes for her....The Father has drawn her in unto Himself; she is no more. Then we see that Simon's "fire is gone out," "the sun has set," "the island is quiet" and at peace. This means also the Ascension of the Virgin; and only her divine Son remains on earth (the *other* island) as witness to her motherhood. Again, the incident is to be repeated when the child himself is grown to manhood. He returns to the "old home," the fabric of the mother, and dandles on his knee a little girl spirit; whose childish patter and babyish girlish ways show best what age Mary Rose has reached. As for this warrior, home from the wars (of life), he is about the same age as her Father when the first "calling away" of his daughter at puberty took place, and his intentions are no less the same. He creeps through the drawing room to the dark passage and throws his blade of the trench—his "visiting card" for "the favoured ones" straight at her door "for her if she can get it," and clasp it she does. He, too, has a "call" to make and like the Father's "call" on the island, it is alone heard by "those for whom it is meant." And thus the son lay (with) the ghost, and the 'something' she is seeking for is found, ere her final ascension back to Heaven....And so the tale repeats itself anew and the immortality of the Father of Creation is assured.

In both calls, Act II, Act III, it can readily be seen that the daughter represents the beautiful, youthful maiden form the mother unconsciously is ever thought to be: in both incidents it is the mother that is intended for his attention. Harry unwittingly hurls his blade at the door of her chamber, "the oldest room" in the fabric of the mother. Mr Morland, on "calling" her to himself is thinking of Mary Rose rather as "the old lady with wrinkles," and of the name on the island trunk which ever stops short at MAR (the knife breaks in the middle of her)—perhaps Mar of Margaret. In neither case, however, is this consciously given expression; and we are left to assume that the problem of the ages can

only be settled on earth as it is in heaven; this the Virgin is here to teach us, and "to justify the ways of God to men." This is Mary Rose's secret; she has "broken some law" of heaven in returning to reveal it; but, says the Son, "He would surely send for you" again, as he does in the end, when "He wanted you."

In reality the solution is a poor one as far as the human race is concerned: it is toying with a big problem and is, of necessity, but doubtfully successful. It is an ideal of a kind, harboured by many desperate minds who would fly in the face of conventions of racial evolution, and eventually be their own unwitting slayers. It may hold for the phantasy of the family in heaven; it must fail for the families on earth. But with Barrie, the earthly family is, for himself, seemingly in the nature of a phantasy; and his solution may be granted. But the complete discussion pro and con of *the* problem is beyond the limits of his simple play and beyond the limits of human understanding and the mind that is finite.

Justification for Identities of Characters as belonging to a SACRED DRAMA.

It may be convenient at this point to see what indications in the play point to the characters of a holy drama, and how far the author's intentions were realised. The whole life and rhythm of the play centres round Mary Rose and it is right that she should first engage our attention. As a woman she is certainly not of this world, "she is different from other girls," "a little odd" with that peculiar "attribute of her that never plays with them." Like the Madonna, she is likened to a flower, "*a rare and lovely flower*," and her parents were never anxious "*to take the bloom off her.*" Like the Virgin [likened to a blood red rose], Mary-the-Rose is her name. Her little calyx (bassinette) holds the Babe; but that flower has inherited eternal youth by the cold finger of fate—a "cold finger had once touched my Mary Rose," as "frost may stop the *growth* of a plant and yet leave it *blooming*."...Her saint-like purity is hinted at in many places. "*What you are worrying about is just her innocence—which seems a holy thing to me.*"..."Marriage...it is so fearfully solemn." "We'll try to be good, won't we?" says Mary Rose; and while Simon is craving for her hand, Mary is sitting in the cold room above "*thinking holy things*" about love; and in her simple way, says Barrie, is worlds above the average "secret women, so much less innocent than she." Her island, which embodies herself (her soul) is a bird *sanctuary*; silent and "still as an empty *church*": and when in the shadow of a church she is buried, that site is a "holy spot." That is the dust, but

her spirit rises "to the stars" of "the empyrean," when the "celestial music" calls her to her Father....Mary is a virgin throughout the play (virgin-mother), but we may spare references to what the reader will detect for himself (*e.g.* How her child is adopted..."some baby you had borrowed..." "I sometimes think so still...." It was a phantom pregnancy and an imaginary delivery when Simon was sent away to Plymouth—an artifice suggested to the author's mind by the recently prominent case of Mrs Slingsby and almost identical; the *ear* rather than a tuft of hair then being stressed in the imagined likeness to the father. The 'holding of her tongue,' her being told 'to dry up' at the end of the scene of making love, both of these metaphorically and in fact, she does. Further, the reflection that she is an island, a garden enclosed, whose whins (whims) have first to be torn down to get through to her and win her—even at the risk of bleeding limbs. And finally, when the "call" does come, is the "attempt to beat them back and put a girdle of *safety* round her"—all these point to her successful guarding of her virginity.)

Finally, she is Maria Stellarum when "the smallest star shoots down from heaven for her." ("My star!" as Simon calls her); and the little thing ascends at the divine call (the music of the spheres) into a "night of stars." Then surely she "*hid her head amid a crown of stars*," and the moment was the Ascension of the Virgin.

In some ways, Simon is very like the Simon of the Gospels. Simon is Peter who holds the key of *heaven*; and if there is any character in the play that holds the key to the secrets of the mother, the key to the lock (loch), the key to the inner door of the passage to her baby's room, which now "is lost," that man is Simon. Simon who "used to go fishing in the Hebrides," and at his first appearance enters with a fishing-rod; is surely 'Simon the fisher.' The obvious course of identifying him with Joseph as Carpenter has not been followed; it is sufficient that his son is 'a hewer of wood.' It may be recalled that the divine Son is hardly represented in the play, and certainly could scarcely be recognised. This is not remarkable, for no open betrayal of its sacred character is allowed, whilst the problem is that between the Virgin and her Father in heaven, and interest is focused largely upon them...for it cannot be really claimed that Harry is the figure of Jesus, except as the 'blue-eyed angel' son of Mary (Rose). But perhaps he has become Man, a rough, rude warrior who has fought in the battle (of life) with us, and at the close finds salvation for his Mother and brings her spirit peace; and his great prayer that God will pardon her "fall" in the world (her one

lapse from grace, her "breaking of one law" "for the sake of that—" son) "has somehow been answered." With the ascension, the Mary Rose of perfection is taken back into Heaven; and Harry to an island continent afar.

But the leading character is he whom Morland himself symbolises. He is present in spirit throughout the play, and is very near at hand at the close of Act II; but the secret of his identity is carefully guarded and only allowed conscious recognition on the last page. Then, the father of Mary Rose has gone to Heaven and is evident in truth as the Heavenly Father. (The subsequent text will make this clearer.) Her island whence she is lost then proves to be no other than Paradise (p. 202), "that island...sounds as if it might be Heaven," whilst the father that has forgotten her is no other than the Deity. "It's like as if He had forgotten you," says Harry....If your's were any sin..."it's surely time He overlooked it," and, desperately,..."He would surely send for you if He wanted to"; and at the close Mary comes back innocently to His home again, even as she did on earth.

MARY ROSE AS DREAM-CHILD. *Remembering and Forgetting.*

So often is the play punctuated with reminders of its dream-happenings, and of the tendency for things to fade and events to be forgotten, as to make us pause to see what meaning lies behind this artifice. What ghosts lurk behind these doors? More especially must we dwell on the figure and personality of Mary Rose; Mary Rose as that odd and dreamy character that Barrie has intended us to conceive, even though at times her "gates are closed and she remembers nothing." We have already suggested that Mary is a dream child, a creation of the mind; but it remains to be seen how this is effected in practice and reflected in reality. The answer is in her three disappearances. How is she *called* away?

In life she is the creature of desires and emotions, in which intellect and reason can have no place. She is the product of that inner Wish that "transmits" its wave-influences at a distance; the unconscious thought that creates its own image, so that mind may fulfil its desire. It is a call to the river side; the call to the apple tree, the call to the island that creates her. It is the call to sustenance and to life that Morland with his 'wireless-telepathy' alone employs. But that subtle power to remember, to recall-to-mind, and create outside oneself, is met by another "wave";—the power of the mind to destroy, to forget, and to recall *from* circulation; and its once-vivacious image fades away. This, the malevolent Call, is also thrice evidenced in the play. It is

the unexpected call from afar that *draws* one away, and can—as Simon views it from the island—"pluck you out of the pulpit as a fish on a long cast" (his father, we notice, dispenses with the line). More poetically both 'calls' are struggling for expression at the close of Act II; the powerful effort to call to mind, as against the dormant desire to call the image away....One is the music of "*unearthly sweetness seeking to beat (its opponent) back, and put a girdle of safety round her*," to keep her still on the island, still in mind; the Other starts as "*whisperings soft and furtive*" at first, but at last clamouring for expression as they increase in violence and are "*horrible* in their mere loudness," to draw her away from consciousness.

This is the anxious striving to forget: and it lures away only those "whom it is intended" to, and thrice proves the stronger call. Both are the workings of mind and emotions, for "recall" has two meanings ('to produce' and 'to withdraw'). Now the author feels that Intellect can have nothing to do with the dream-creations of the emotions and the powers that govern their come and go: "We told several doctors, but they had no explanation for it, except that it never took place"..."all the clever ones of the day probing." When passions sway the mind we are ready enough to cherish our delusions. "*I believe them all when I am here*"; when we openly face reality they fade away "*though I turn the cold light of remorseless Reason on them when I am in Aberdeen.*" One brought up on Euripides 'the rationalist,' is alone able to do this. Beyond the power or intent of the author of her being, is such an effort of renunciation: and for him at least Mary Rose is believed in, and lives secure. The desire of the father in the play is a strong one: and he, with that wondrous invention—the marvel of the future—foremost in his mind, concentrating all his attention upon her creation, is aided by the thoughts of his household, and thus feeds her with life and maintains for a time her conscious existence. "It was as if Mary Rose were just something beautiful that *you and I and Simon had dreamt together.*" The delusion is their own; the Sussex neighbours were therefore quite unable to feel with them and "did not like it," "she was not *their* Mary Rose" you see....

It is not pleasant being a dream-child. Whatever her parents think must perforce be the thoughts of Mary Rose. Witness her first summons to the scene; and it will be recalled that whilst her parents talk and ponder over her island with Simon, this is her synchronous thought elsewhere ("*I had almost forgotten it, and then suddenly I remembered it...frightfully distinctly*"). Again, she that is thought of as ever young

and never "grown up" ("*a finger has...stopped her growth*") like Peter Pan, so thinks herself to be and phrases her speech accordingly. It is always childish. All the while attention is being focused on her image; she lives, indeed she shines forth with hallucinatory vividness; without it she must die. And here is the interesting point; for the parents to harbour such hallucination is considered unseemly, and it is projected on to Mary Rose. They think "*she has been seen talking to some person who wasn't there or listening as it were for some sound that never came.*" The girl cannot, of course, guess the source of all her thoughts, of her images and sounds—her creator: she only knows "I live *with* my daddy and mother, for Simon is so often away at sea"; but believes them to come to her from without, and that the "*little old woman of the stairs*" tells her..."I wonder whether I *have* noticed her listening for a sound." In this way she is odd and different from other girls.

As fast as the parents recall, she recalls. When they forget, she forgets. "It is just that the island has faded from *her* memory."... "*They* never seem to want to talk of it" says Mary, and thus is her phantom mind fed....But when that desire of her father creator no longer holds, when for a time he forgets and puts his dream-daughter out of his mind, instantly the image fails; the spell breaks—"she couldn't help it" as they admit, and she sinks into the phantom island that gave her birth. The world beyond the mists has called her away. In other words, Mary Rose has returned home to the mind that created her, to the dark depths of the Unconscious, into the world of fancy; at the moment when the light has faded and the sun has sunk into the ocean's womb. But true to the habits of human nature, the desire somehow lingers "long after there was no sense in searching"; for father—like daughter—has probably "forgotten who it is" he is "searching, searching for." He "knew once"; and her mother "*did cling for a time* (to this delusion) "*and half thought she was on the island still*"; while Simon "...went back (mentally) to the island every year." They feel "...for a *moment* he has not been here himself, *he has been on an island*"; "...and then he missed a year, and that somehow ended" the delusion[1], and he ceases to think of her. And after this there is nothing but evidence of the forgotten fancy of them all, especially of her father who created her. As the years roll by, the mind "getting dark," the sight beginning to fail, the hearing weaker, 'all desire fails.' True to Simon's boyish

[1] The use of all these metaphorical expressions is very significant, and it is such hints throughout the play that half-consciously betray the unreality of both Island and daughter.

advice "*I say, let's forget all about it,*" we find how readily the family does put their plaything away. *E.g.*

The Mother: "That room I often go into without *remembering* it was hers and the child's."

The Father: "You are well-nigh forgotten, Mary Rose." "I am afraid I was rather thoughtless about her tree (Did she use to climb the apple-tree?)"..."I never think of the island now"; and Mary echoing his thoughts had said: "I had almost forgotten about the island...." "it's just that the island has faded from her memory...."

The Son: "I saw her and I didn't know her...I recognised it, but I didn't *remember* it was hers."

She is dead and buried in their minds "As the years go by the *dead* recede farther from us." For Simon's part "his work has taken her place"; it is on the sea whence Mary rose. For the father it is buried in an interest in prints and drawings that once may have been hers—a Cousin's for a daughter's. And thus Mary Rose forgets everything too: "forgotten the call," "forgotten the island," and forgotten is the child.

A Specific Detail paused over: "The Call."

But she that is the image of his desire, can after so many years be revived or revive herself again. However deeply our whims and wishes are forgotten, some unknown "unseen devil" may chucklingly recall them: they are thrust back into consciousness in all their primitive loveliness. They are the embodiment of our present longings for the old loved things of the past; for "*Mary Rose belongs to the past and we have to live in the present.*" It is "always 'was' about Mary Rose; it just has to be." And thus while the full focus of attention is once more concentrated on her being, while the old couple reflect on their erstwhile forgotten dream-child of the past, she awakes and stands ready to return. For the old desire has come back; says the aged Morland, "I daresay I *could* go there and fish."..."If we could bring her back to tell us... I think it would be a shame"; but so thought his *alter ego* Cameron, "there was such joy on her face as she slept (in his mind) that it was a shame to waken her," from the limbo of things forgotten: "the sleeping dogs" of thought. But the desire once started in the home of forgotten dreams, cannot so easily be settled to rest. It is "all in a tremble of desire, and the travail can never be completed" but in the birth of her image anew. Thus we have her spontaneous return a second time. "*She came back*"—says Simon—"*in my train (of thought), I did not recognise her*" (cf. the revival of the ancestors when attention is focused upon them in *Blue Bird*, Act II)....But it is Mary Rose of the past they see, 'just the same beautiful young' image as at first conceived, for thought does not feel the passage of time. It has no need to recloak its

images; but she is a "little indistinct" now, "*we cannot see her quite so clearly*"; for Mary rose from the past.

But the poor, ageing father presented once again with the renounced longings of the heyday of his youth is overcome and overwhelmed. He finds that desire has failed, love is cold; and refuses to dwell longer on the old time phantasy: "Please don't talk of it to me, I am...an old man," and he falls back on his interest in "the little things of life... cannot cope...cannot cope." And all too regretfully he asks himself, "Do you think she should have come back" to mind?

Nevertheless the brilliant author goes one step further. He hints too, that so great is that yearning—the wish of the parent for a child—(Morland for Mary: Mary for Harry)—that the desire of our thoughts outlives their expression; nay outlives their expressor, that is the mortal frame, and lingers for eternity in the everlasting Mind....For when all the household are dead and gone, she—"a little ghostie"—remains behind; unwanted on earth and forgotten in heaven—to haunt the aged house of long ago....It is that sacred Wish which is symbolised in the *spirit* of Mary Rose, who solemnly remains a ghost till her Master Creator (Heaven) draws her back into its mind.

The Motif of the Call.

As the CALL to Mary Rose forms the psychological rallying point of the whole play, it may be desirable to consider its real significance at rather greater length than as hinted at in the discussion of the sacred drama, p. 188. We have claimed that while Mary Rose is the daughter, Simon is the son. One is the true daughter, but unreal; the other, adopted son, but real. Despite this, the incestuous union between them even in thought seems to be disturbing, and in part accounts for the artifice of unreality. But it is permitted on the surface because the whole is a dream-creation and morality does not enter into dreams, let alone those of a rough private; and further we are fairly clearly given to understand that the marriage is never consummated, and as far as earth is concerned Mary remains a virgin. In the depths of the Unconscious its bar is not countenanced. The Call overcomes it. The call denotes the *real* union—a union with the Father creator of the phantasy—thrice in the course of the play. For he himself is enamoured of his dream-daughter—she is attractive, "she draws," and he in turn "*fishes around* her island" the while. He cannot for a moment permit any other to have intercourse with her even in thought. This accounts for his obvious harshness to Simon at the scene of the proposal, and probably

also Simon's harshness to his son. Therefore after permitting the tenderest of love-making scenes between them (Act II), and allowing the son to approach her—the sparks of the fire he has made ever rising anew as the other beats them down—another and unholy "organ" visits the virgin island of his dreams; with a whistling wind along its pipes, and ever "increasing in volume" till she is drawn away by the love-call and disappears from the boy's sight, the spot indeed becoming "the scene of the crime." This means the author of her being, the father-creator, has kept her for himself and his pleasure, has drawn her back into his mind and ultimately suppressed her from consciousness, even as he did years before, when first she became the object of sexual desire in the fullness of his youth—lost her in the mists of the Unconscious. She is forgotten, she exists no more to her earthly husband, to her friends, and even to her father....What happens when he revives the old phantasy and finds desire has failed, we already know; he cannot face her, he is disturbed only because she revives the question..."Where is her mortal child?" "Where is the child of their union?" He is no longer to be found a baby. For as we are left to discern, at the moment he has grown up to be a man, a man of the same age as the squire when first he married, who stands before the same girl once again; Mary, no older than she whom Morland first conceived, and the plaything, too, of Simon and Harry, each in turn. It is 'as if' the hour-glass sands were rolling back; and the father, through her agency has recognised in Harry, for the first time, the emblem of his rejuvenated self. This is too much for him, and the shock of its meaning brings the dream to a close.

Punctuations of the Poet.

Now, judged as Literature, *Mary Rose* might well be considered unique among the plays of Barrie, for the high level of poetry, symbolism, and simplicity of diction which it maintains. It is not our purpose herein to praise or appraise its literary worth, nor to linger over the play's intrinsic beauty. But in passing, we cannot but pay tribute to the success of the gradual unfolding of the theme and the delicacy of suggestions let fall; to the skilful handling of dramatic irony, and the preservation of atmosphere (whether joy, anger or the mysterious); and to the poetic vocabulary and metaphor Barrie has in places so fittingly employed. At times he even ascends to lyric verse:

> I wísh to Gód you woúld and lét her rést.
> The gátes had clósed, and shé remémbered nóthing.
> I can sée the twflight rúnning acróss the fiélds.

The loveliest time of all will be
When he is a man and takes me on his knee.
Some misty, eerie highland story.
— ⏑ ⏑ — ⏑ ⏑ — ⏑ | — ⏑ ⏑ —
You and your bogies and wraiths, you|man of the mists.

And he coins such beautiful expressions, melodious and sweet as

"Your poor lonely island"..."A rare and lovely flower"..."The last time of anything is always sad."

...There are worse things than not finding what you are looking for, finding them so different from what you had hoped.

"The birds came...to listen to the silence"..."Don't you think laughter is a very pretty sound?"

Whilst the stage directions at each of the two "calls" are gems of poetic description (close of Acts II and III).

THE PROBLEM OF SYMBOLISM AND ITS PART IN THE PLAY.

The deliberate impress of the hand of the poet on the play brings us to that licence usually conceded to them, and herein employed with consummate skill—the use of symbolism; that is the expression of a train of thoughts, or reference to a living being by an inanimate (symbolic) object. Three or four such stand out in the play and call for explanation, for only if we understand them aright can we grasp the real significance of the play. These seem to be earth, air, fire and water; or (to be more exact), Tree, island of the mists, Trench-knife and Sea; and tireless are the references to each throughout.

Sea.

Firstly the sea: This is essentially a sea-play, and it is from the ocean-depths that it borrows much of its metaphors and similes. From the moment when Mary rose from the sea into life, until Simon ends his life by drowning at sea, the noise of water never really leaves us. The keynote of the play is in the father's remark: "His work (the sea) took her place": the loss of Mary Rose is only forgotten in the sea-life Simon leads, which "he wouldn't exchange for any other in the world." The sea has come to take some woman's place in many people's lives, for it seems to have an attraction and meaning all its own. First it will be noted that each of the characters in turn is mentioned as 'going down to the sea in a boat.' Mary Rose in the punt, Cameron in the ferry boat, Harry in his coracle, or in dry-dock (bassinette), Morland in the fishing-boat, and Simon as sailor rising through an interesting succession of ships; indeed the sea-craft of Lieut. Sobersides in many ways reflects the progress of his life.

He is first heard of putting to shore off his ship the *Gadfly* among the islands of the outer Hebrides; he is seemingly that *Gadfly* alighting, or landing—on the 'grazing cow' as the 'placid isle' is called. Next he is in the Punt which he capsizes in the river so that he may rescue Mary Rose from the water. When he *wins* Mary Rose it is like winning Trafalgar, and being on the *Victory*, with a senior officer indicating from the bridge "England expects her lieutenant this day to do his duty." Next he is with the *Valiant*, but on his wife's supposed delivery he is posted to Plymouth (the Armada: the *Mayflower*): and later H.M.S. *Britannia* is his ship, *i.e.* He is aboard the 'mother who rules the waves,' 'the mother of the free.' When home on leave—for "Simon is often away at sea," we meet him playing the part of the Castaway, wrecked upon an island, *i.e.* (Robinson Crusoe) with his adopted son as savage (Act I). Finally he captains the *Bellerophon*—"the child of the sea"—the ship that took Napoleon to a lonely island of the Waters; or best known to us classically as the "son of the sea," "the child of Neptune." On this he took his last voyage, and is drowned in the depths, leaving a son to follow in his wake. Harry already as a baby was "learning swimming" at home, and as soon as old enough "ran away to the (blasted) ocean"—the salt is in the blood!

Water is variously portrayed in the play; as the water of the loch that separates the daughter-island from the bigger mother-isle—an island compared in itself to the size of the "Round Pond." There is the water of the little pool or lake, on the island itself "from which a stream flows"; also the sea on which the 'sea-dog' Simon lives; and the ocean where Harry goes to make his fortune—and the ocean of heaven with its thousands of island stars; and incidentally wireless is only of value in that we can talk "to ships on the ocean." The semblance of Mrs Morland is embodied in the "*water* fall" in a house "where you cannot hear the sound of the sea at all" (cf. also water in metaphor: "the talk that leaves no ripple": "like one taking his bearings," "Come aboard, Sir!" "whaling-station," etc.). Thus in more ways than one the play seems super-saturated with water, but there is no one solution of its symbol.

Albeit, it is the figure of the Ship on river and ocean that stands out, and the symbol is fairly plain. Each of the characters is pictured—it will be remembered, as rowing his own boat. The ships are ourselves, each in his own degree of (sea)worthiness, and the ocean and river are the waters of Time. Across this loch or sea, our bark must sail; from the still waters of the port whence as children we set off to make our fortune on the...ocean. For long we cross that stretch of deep that separates us from eternity, saving ourselves as best we may from wreckage on the rocks of life, up to the last port of call—"the island that likes to be visited." Thence there is no return and all "are afraid to visit it." We are ships on the waters—

> A wanderer is man from his birth
> He was born on a ship on the breast of the River of Time...;

and of his sailing out and coming home to land we remember

> When that which drew from out the boundless deep
> Turn again home.

The sea in the play means all this, and the metaphor of the life-course across the waters is plain sailing. We steer our course till, like the sun at setting or the son (Simon) at the end of his life, we sink into the waters, whence we first, like Mary, rose. And only the dawn of another day shall see us rising from the other horizon where earth and heaven meet....Even the little pool and its tiny stream on the island have a like meaning, as we shall show; its waters like the ocean seem to be our birth place. For we are children "rocked in the cradle of the deep," or rising from the Font of life, swelling and sinking with its depths, till we come to live again. This is the symbol of the waters.

Barrie's own mixed feelings and adoration for the river may be well seen in a recently delivered speech to young school girls on the LIN-CLADEN. The river is his only partner in life—the best of women he knew. A few of its gems are:

> When you and I were young they were our partners at the ball....We must always have something in common that others cannot have, if we sat out a dance with the Claden....She was my favourite partner of all, and sometimes she sang to me and sometimes I had a book with me to improve her mind...
>
> Still I see the river dimple by
> Holding its face up to the sky.
>
> I wooed her in a canoe, but she was a capricious mistress, and went off with the canoe, leaving me with the water....The next time one of you goes in pursuit of her...I wish you would give her my love and say that I never think of her without feeling regret.

The Symbol of the Two Islands.

Tantalising a symbol as it is, the Island beyond the mists leaves us baffled, even at the end, as to the significance it is intended to convey; and there is no allusion or illusion in the play capable of so many possible interpretations. Probably each is right, for the island embodies no one thought, but a thousand—ultimately moulded into a composite living whole. Earlier in this essay we tried to follow how our author takes us back into his home and atelier, watching his phantasy figure in process of creation and a Galatea in the sculptor's hands; and we hinted that we were presently to be taken into the sculptor's master-mind and watch the birth of his mental image. The Second Act is in part this beautiful revelation.

The island represents that void in our thought-life filled by degrees with the harvest of all the senses, the images of the past and manners of life long forgotten; a world complete in itself, the island of the Unconscious. It is an unreal thing of which we are most often unaware, an island that is not ever present to our scrutiny: "It was not always here, then one day it was here." "There are some who say...'the Island...goes for

a jaunt.'"..."I am not always watching it," says Cameron. In other words the dream-world comes and goes, "it has no authority to be here"; and when it is gone it means "*it is just that the island has faded away from...memory.*"

Besides being itself the symbol of the unconscious mind, the Island embodies, what is to some the same thing, the *dreams* of the unconscious crystalised in one creation, the creation of Mary Rose. A beautiful thought flitting through the mind is just expressed as a dream figure lost on a phantom island. And Mary Rose is that dream-figure, that beautiful thought. Thus neither will bear close scrutiny, and both fade in the light of reason; and to keep up the pretence "while on the island" (*i.e.* in one's own mind), it is best "to believe them all"; for "remorseless Reason" can only shatter them. The phantasy has to be encouraged, and the island humoured, choosing "the proper way to speak of it," and avoiding "things it may not like to hear," or it cannot remain with us. That it is really only seen in imagination is hinted at when Morland first tries to describe it in his armchair: "*he sees that island so clearly that he forgets to go on.*"

As in reality, so in thought, there is only one way of bringing to birth and that is by the symbol of the womb. The island beyond is not alone a moss-grown stretch of imagination, it is the womb of creation clothed in metaphor. The unconscious world is just such an island. Indeed the mind that is ever creating embodies the "womb of fancy," and it is easy to see that the structure of this island to its minutest detail is but a mirror of the mother that creates: a symbol more especially of the Virgin Mother—Mary Rose as mother and maiden, Mary Rose as island-mother. Thus the real mother—Mrs Morland—of the play has no part on this fertile island of *hers*. "She didn't go" with father and daughter "to the island." Like the nurse, her place was on the other side of the loch, and with good reason! For that little "miniature world" was the daughter island, which the "big island had to spew forth, but could not sink." The bigger Island or the Inn whence Mary Rose set out, symbolises her mother, and the 'loch' is the 'link' between them. But it should be noted that the mother isle has a typical coastline: "a shore very bleak and barren, rocks and rough grass, I never saw a tree." The very antithesis of the fertile spot beyond, barrenness is written all over it. It has its 'wailing-station' and typifies all too plainly the barren woman of the play, that all the little fishes of the loch between, and the husband fishing with his line on the waters, nay, not all the waters of the rough rude sea can dispel nor overcome. It is really the

image of impotency rather than sterility; it is Morland bereft of his Spouse, it is George bereft of "her we never meet," it is a reflection of connubial life that has failed, and in truth of a barren island-shore. When our author conjured up this symbolism surely at the back of his mind reposed those bleak lines of a poet and disappointed lover:

> O my cousin, shallow hearted, O my Amy, mine no more,
> O the dreary, dreary moorland (morland), O the barren, barren shore.

Amy is the wife enticed away (Mrs Amy, "her we never meet") and the Morlands (pronounced Moorland) typify sterility, and the big Island with its "*bleak and barren shore.*"

In comparison with the barren Mother-shore of Fanny, the island-daughter is "*a fairer sight to look upon*"... "*it is a sort of miniature land... curiously complete in itself*" *with* "*wild mosses of various hues that are a bath to the eyes,*" it is covered with berries and bracken and has many trees; it is well irrigated and symbolises Mary Rose herself. It symbolises her, even while she protests it "was little like myself"; for Simon says, "it was obviously made to fit you, or you to fit it"; it is "my little island," "her darling," "*a sulky lady asleep.*" It indicates herself; "sometimes there and sometimes not," in other words it is the same dream-creation beyond the mists of Morland's mind.... The island is the symbol of her womb. It contains the lake of water (liquor amnii) which streams away to the sea, its little stream also serving as a passage for the fishes of the lake. Her "favourite spot," where she is twice found quietly sitting (or asleep) with legs flexed up and arms bent, as if sketching, is a moss-covered trunk of an old tree distinguished with the name MAR (the placenta of the island womb).

It is curious that the creation was never completed. MAR alone was carved by the sculptor and the blade of the knife always breaks in the middle of her whose name it intended to make known: MAR as if of Margaret; Mar—the child's call for its mother: Mar—pronounced Mère for the unfinished Mary; or 'Mer' (for they speak in French that the mysteries, and 'things dangerous' might not be known) '*the Sea*' from which like us all, she first arose (Mer-y rose Mary Rose); and finally it may hint at the "cold finger" on "her innocence," that of old did Mar her virginity: "the broken law," the injury to the island, "the scene of the Crime" that "should by now be forgotten."

No visitor comes to the island, this "safe place" where her father leaves her; whins and bracken and shrubs must be torn down to make an approach. Indeed it is on the shore of the virgin land, "these parts," that a number of red berries can now be seen on the rowan tree (*carun-*

culae myrtiformes). Mary Rose sitting on the placenta of her island-womb seems as if re-creating herself that she might never grow old. It beautifully expresses her character of Virgin-Mother who needs no 'visitor,' 'no bird,' and no 'organ-pipe' with a message or 'call' from other worlds to revivify her womb. We have shewn that she is the personification of the Virgin. She is more. Her silent "darling island," her Self, is likened to "*an empty church*," it is a sanctuary of birds and of babes; and the little pool in its midst (once dragged for a baby who had disappeared) must represent its central Font, from which in baptism mankind is born again.

The island is herself, and into its very substance she melts away, when the mind calls her back. The womb of fancy that created her, swallows her up at the very moment when the sun that has been "playing hide and seek with her" sinks into the depths, and sets behind those "bleak hills" of the parent shore....So far then we have viewed this symbol as Island of the Unconscious dream-life, a World of Phantasy, isle of the Virgin Mother, the fertile garden, Mary Rose herself. It only remains to reflect on its ultimate significance in the play. That is as "the island of the blessed," "islands of the west," "island that likes to be visited," "Island amid the Stars," "Island beyond the mists" and beyond the Veil—Paradise itself.

We are sufficiently acquainted with the conception of Eden in religious thought, and poetic thought, to detect it in the play, *e.g.* the two Trees, the Tree of Wisdom (rowan- rune) and the tree of Life; the river flowing from an inland lake; its hillocks and glades, "fair to look upon"; a "blessed spot" where two innocents might make love undisturbed, "a sort of miniature land." In other words the island is the Land of Paradise, "the Garden of the Lord."...Now Paradise holds out different hopes and vistas to different people. To some it is "the land where the dead souls go," to others the isle whence new visitors come. It is filled with a myriad babies yet unborn—those "too many birds" that come to visit the world, with never the real blue-bird amongst them. By Maeterlinck the latter aspect is stressed. Barrie prefers the former; ultimately in the hope that the World beyond embraces both; and there the Master Craftsman will use his returning spirit stuff over and over again. In other words "the darling island" is "that glory place" that "is lovely, lovely," the world beyond "the stars," the island of desires we call Paradise: "*the land where the dead dreams go.*" As we watch (Act III) a little star come down for her whose face is radiant at the last—an island of light to which she 'trustingly raises her hands'—we cannot

but feel it is *her* island again taking her back unto itself; a phantom back into the dream; and Mary Rose is Paradise itself. She is thenceforth to be the virgin mother in whose lap the dead so peacefully sleep, till the 'call' of resurrection "in celestial music" is heard once more.

To sum up the Island Symbol; we have the Island of Phantasies and Mary Rose, its unconscious creation, upon it; who is herself the Island when she is lost in its fabric; it is the land of heart's desire, an oasis of fertility amid stretches of barrenness; it is the island—Paradise, to which our hopes return. All are ultimately but the *image of our Unconscious commensurate with the dream of Mary Rose.*

Symbol of the Two Trees.

The moss-covered root of the parent-trunk whereon Mary Rose is seated so contentedly on the island, takes us back to another moss-strewn trunk on another island; the trunk of the ancient tree that Harry first revealed to us in the garden of his home. Like the tree once fabled standing in the Garden of Eden, this too is an apple tree; and the reference within the play to Mrs Morland as the "old Eve" and the Father as "old Adam" before that tree, enables us to see in it the symbol of the Tree of Life. And its seasonal progress with Time may be seen (as we have shown, p. 179) through the play. The tree of life is the mother tree, whose apples are its breasts; the tree where we were born and where we played.

> I wakened thee under an apple tree; 'twas there thy Mother brought thee forth,
> She brought thee forth that made thee.... (*Cant.* VIII. 5.)

In old age the parent tree is frailer; the fruits are fallen, the leaf is seared; but, as the author says, "Mr and Mrs Morland are still bearing their apples"—the breasts of consolation. (Thus at the first, Mary Rose is born out of the apple tree—her first appearance before us as she walks forth from its midst[1], and back to it she returned.)

The tree is no less "*her* tree" as Virgin and Mother herself, and it was 'down her trunk' that the baby "slid down" "and slipped away into the world"; or as Harry feels, the tree is in truth his mother ("*The apple tree...her darling boy*"), and its foliage guards one of the entries to the house. As the life sap within begins to dry up, and the tree totters and is in "danger of falling," that means the last day has come. And it is cut down full of years, to form a seat in the Garden (just as it did on the Island), a seat for the child, and for one who follows after; since the mother must ever be sacrificed that the child may be born.

[1] Like Jean d'Arc she is born already mature and we are not to surmise that she was ever a dream-baby. She is first thought of when we first see her.

An Analysis of the Psychological Determinants.

It may be thought that the tree of Life should never wither, never fade, but be eternal. Upon the island it is so (rowan and fir "You don't look a bit older"); here upon earth, life must fail. The spirit of Mary Rose is all-sufficing to remind us of the blossom that is eternal and the fruit that never fades; and life that is as youthful as at first blush of its unfolding....The phantasy is brought home to us in a curious incident that not long ago captured the popular mind; and will probably be recalled. It seems to have influenced our author in his theme, and there perhaps he gained a little of his material. It is hinted at in the otherwise pointless reference to "*our trip to Switzerland with Simon two years ago.*" We may be pardoned recalling this touching incident of the trip.

...A newly married bridegroom accompanied his bride to the Swiss Alps, where they were spending their honeymoon. While climbing together one day, she suddenly lost him. He had fallen into a crevasse. All efforts to find him or rescue him had failed; but the devotion of his wife and her hope never flagged. She consulted the experts of the day and had scientific observations made, and it was thought that the slow movements of the glacier might bring the body to a point where it might be actually recovered; but only after a lapse of 40 years.

The widow remained faithful to her first love, and returned to the foot of the glacier at the appointed time where, according to the story, the body was finally found. It had remained quite unchanged in the intense cold of the glacier throughout all this period. The wife had returned an old wrinkled woman; while her husband's body when recovered was that of a young man sleeping: in all the freshness of youth and just as he once had been: wearing the clothes of another generation....

How carefully the beautiful story has been followed (almost every word has its echo) it is needless to point out. But we must stress, it is Simon who goes to Switzerland and Mary Rose who says "*I shall come back when I am an old lady with wrinkles*"; and he whom she finds is in truth in the dress of another generation; nay, is of the *same age* as the husband of her youth, still young (with the same "little tuft of hair to be smoothed down") and indeed "frozen with the cold." (Her husband is thus "Simon called Peter" (Pan) who never grew up.) Why the figure of Mary Rose is chosen to be lost so many years among the bleak mountains, instead of Simon (as in the episode), we cannot enter into here[1]. (The incident is described in Collin's *Alpine Climbing*, 1925.)

[1] One final word on this much "over-determined" theme. The poem *Sixty Years After*, wherein a squire returning to his Hall reflects on the ghosts of his past, contains many points of parallel besides Amy. Secondly, a girl's actual disappearance on an island in similar circumstances to Mary about 60 years ago, and her later return (as recognised by her red sunshade) is still believed in and remembered in the Hebrides. So uncanny was the phenomenon that Scotland Yard was called upon to investigate! But how ingeniously have all these determinants (which betray themselves in the elaboration of the play) been seized upon by the Unconscious in the satisfying of a complex.

Symbol of the Trench-knife.

Those who have grasped the significance of the House and its architecture as outlined in the first part of this essay, will scarce need explanation of the symbol of the Trench-knife and its importance to the play. It is bound up in more senses than one with the figure of the returning soldier—the prodigal son Harry, who therewith redeems his own reputation, by finding rest and salvation for his mother in another world. We might only pause to reflect how the "young shaver" has become the "old blade" as Mr Morland expresses it: and like the "unholy organ visiting the island" in its "call" to Mary Rose in years rolled by: this "fearsome weapon," his blade, is his own "visiting card." "*I* have a call to make" too, he says, and that which 'raked the bushes for her,' is now a *smoking* pipe; a *lighted* candle or a 'clasp *knife*' of the trench hurled through the dark passage "for her if she can get it" and "to give the old girl a chance." And, it is "out of its light," that Mary Rose as a spirit "is made."

THE UNCONSCIOUS INCONGRUITIES.

No running commentary on the play, no annotated version or even compendium of its contents, could really do justice to its curious details or adequately explain its passing incongruities. We have no pretensions of making the attempt but prefer to leave them unexplained, the better to preserve some mysteries by the way, as the narrative unfolds itself; hoping against hope that the clue slumbers with the author. How, for example, can we really grasp why, in his tender conversation with Mary Rose concerning her island visit, Harry should blurt out,

"As if in a way there were two kinds of dogs out hunting you, the good and the bad."

What does it mean? Frankly we do not know; and only plead with Mary Rose, "Please don't be cross with me." It will possibly be suggested that the rival elements stand for him who "still hunts with the hounds"...and him who is described as "the puppy" and the "sea-dog." Both are clamouring for Mary Rose, on the island when the call comes:—the father who cannot part with her image and tries to withdraw her from memory unto himself:—the son who tries to remember and keep her *back* in the world of consciousness. They are actually symbolised in the rival voices on the Island—the good and the bad, heard in Act II. Thus one is "soft and furtive" growing into "a storm and whistling winds, increasing in volume till the mere loudness is horrible"..."They are not without an opponent," says the play. That is the voice of the

other, "also calling her name," and from it issues "...An earthly sweetness that is seeking to beat them back and put a girdle of safety round her." But which is the good and which the bad it is impossible to say; suffice it that "the good dogs have got her," but she is too tired of men (too "dog-tired") to care: or as Morland says "Sleeping dogs" of the island (are best left lie).

Then there is "the little old woman on the stair" (Act I *b*) who first told Mary of her island. Who is she? As we shall learn from Mrs Otery later (III *b*) that Mary Rose meets her on the stairs and talks to her, it seems a dramatic prevision of the ghost-life to come. Or is it merely a dream-touch of Harry who brings back that real "gaunt little figure" he had spoken to but five minutes before. As he reminds Mary later "*as I was sitting by the fire alone I seemed to hear you as you once were...*" but as to its certain meaning we are still in the dark.

It may be asked, "Why must the hurling of a butter dish indicate the annunciation to Mary that she is with child?" Does it mean "the breast is now filled with milk" or a babe is being moulded for her out of butter (a not uncommon child's fancy)? Mary of the Paradise of Promise is "flowing with milk and honey"...just as the Scriptures speak of the creation of the infant embryo: "Hast thou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese?...Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh"...etc. (Job x. 10). We do not know.

Why is the son-in-law Simon Sobersides to the island, when he is Morland and Blake to us? It is Mary Rose's pet name for him, a delicate compliment to his gallantry: but really a 'portmanteau word' (as Carroll calls it) compound of many origins. Sober-sides: and he prides himself on his sobriety. "It's a wonder I never took to drink." Of *sober* temperament in life too; controlling himself like young Cameron to a remarkable degree, when he could split his *sides* with laughter (sober-sides). His first introduction to us is as a youth in a fit of laughter even as it is with 'Cameron'—"I will finish my laugh." Further the Sober-sides denote his stern front, "a face that could be stern to harshness," and a reminder that he is of the "*Iron*-sides," Cromwell's distinguished fighters: this is more evident when we see that his name is Simon Blake whose namesake, again of Cromwell's day (indeed Blake and Cromwell were born in the same year), Mary Rose hopes is reborn in her lieutenant; and that in this way "the loveliest" of armies and navies of England are worthily embodied in Lieutenant Simon Sobersides, to whom she alone is a "senior officer."

Why...but they are too many, they come crowding upon us; the

'whys' are best reserved for the more learned, the doctors and the wise. They will probably say of it all "It never happened."..."You can believe that too if you like!"

CONCLUSIONS.

Thus much for our better understanding of the play, for our understanding of Barrie. When we have said this, we have said all....His style, at once so intimate and absorbing, only serves to bring him, in every play he presents us, one step further in his self-revelation; and for our part, to carry us one stage further in devotion to his master mind. Old characters speak again, we pick up a score of lost threads. What need to be reminded how Mary or Mar is the poet's Margaret, the dream-child of old, the might-have-been of *Dear Brutus* ("It might-have-been Mary Rose") the daughter no less than the mother? How significant and characteristic of him to gloss over the cannonade of war in one instantaneous block-out, that separates the last return of Mary Rose and Harry's awakening; in reality a space of five whole years ("If this War does come"..."the War lately ended"). Have we not seen Harry before? Is he not the boorish private in *The Old Lady shows her Medals*? For at this stage it is scarcely necessary to point out that both he and Simon are adopted sons in the play.

One fact must surely emerge from the study of *Mary Rose*, and one of which we feel the author is consciously unaware, and that is the hopeless barrenness of every character in the play. Thence comes the brave attempt to redeem its sombre pathetic truth with the sparkle of the manifest story, and the glowing feast of light and life that is the dream-lyric of Mary Rose. In evident support of the first, we may view Simon "who never married (again)": Cameron who "will remain a bachelor until..." and does so; Harry the unattached; Mr Amy with his childless, 'whiskery,' wife, and Morland true to his name. This too can find explanation, but it is idle to dwell on it; except perhaps to point out—and those who follow the chronology and hints of the play will see it for themselves, for space forbids our reasons—how old Amy, old Cameron and old Morland on the one hand, are but images of one and the same figure; and that Simon, Harry, and young Morland on the other, are a further composite figure—this time of Youth. The "two (are) living in a very small room, together..."father and son." Both groups are longing for the hand of Mary Rose—a creature who is the perfection ideal of their dream—*an unreal phantasy that cannot be*—a woman that cannot be—either's.

But as we cast a last long lingering look behind, on our fading Eurydice, we realise that that sad character is there to give us consolation in the knowledge "that hope keeps breaking through," and in the feeling of which *she* provides the living evidence—that those we loved of yesterday and whose memories we cherish, grow younger ever younger as we grow old; and our love for some Elder's image at the first is still fostered unchanged as we advance, even kindly rejuvenated somewhere while we sleep. Until in after years, we, the ageing turn back to glance at it, to find it is the image of a child!

THE REABSORBED AFFECT AND ITS ELIMINATION[1]

By TRIGANT BURROW, M.D., Ph.D.

Our definitions are necessarily just as loose as the concepts for which they stand. They have their day and then fade again along with other transient things. The same definition or concept may even vary with the earth's latitude. The God of the Hindus is quite a different personification from that of the Christian deity. A Democrat possesses one signification above the Mason and Dixon Line and quite another below it. A 'gentleman' remains to this day an indeterminate evaluation and 'ladies' are equally nondescript. The reason is that our social designations are dependent upon our personal affects and must vary infinitely with the infinite variety of these emotional tones.

To define the affect then would be no less ambitious a task than to seek in the emotional sphere for the mathematical symbol of infinity. As affects must vary with the individual affected, we can perhaps approach no closer to an exact definition of an affect than to say that it is an emotion or reaction that is personally coloured. But this still leaves us with such vague generalities as 'personally' and 'coloured,' so that 'personally coloured affects' leaves us in as confused a chaos of indefiniteness as that with which we set out. In the midst then of this amorphous mass of ephemeral and changing meanings I can discover no fixed point upon which to set the compass of annotation. In the midst of these etymologically imprecise fields one's mind gropes aimlessly in its search of orientation. It seems to me, therefore, that amid this welter of signals that makes up our changing code the only possible security which we can seize and hold to is our momentary understanding with each other. Let us then quit the etymologists, the logicians, the philosophers and all the learned ways of the Academies and return to the very simplest and earliest of biological formulations—the formulation, namely, constituting the earliest and most primary of human relationships—the relationship designated under the formula 'you and me.' For if we are to reconstruct in conscious terms the complex equations that represent

[1] Paper read at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, New York City, June 11, 1926.

to-day the biology of man's thought with its infinite linguistic code, I think we must begin by returning to those simplest algebraic formulae in which we shall find expressed our most rudimentary human relationships.

In a recent paper I referred to the absence among us as yet of scientifically controlled measures for tracing mental disharmonies to a mentally generic source[1]. A very few years ago, as we know, there was lacking this basis of definitive laboratory enquiry even with respect to structural disease entities. The germ theory of disease was still unknown and unsuspected. The clinician of a half-century ago dealt entirely individually with each individual illness. The disease had a name and this name constituted its status in the world of medical science. To-day within the mental sphere the clinical picture presented by the individual patient restricts itself to this same limited and casual designation. There is not yet established a definitive etiology underlying these isolated manifestations traceable to a common pathogenic root. Dementia praecox is such a designation, hysteria another, cyclothemia still another. Indeed, our clinical definitions are numberless. For science has yet to invoke a unitary principle of enquiry based upon a consensus of observers such as will trace these arbitrarily designated appearances to a common generic source[2].

But to return to 'you and me.' We all recall more or less a certain very early, all-pervading, childish mood composed of socially very simple, almost primal affect-elements. To cite certain of these organic stimuli, there was, you remember, 'nice Mama,' 'good Papa,' 'bad Fido frighten baby,' 'naughty kitty scratch baby.' We all remember the remote seductive influence of these early nursery days in which there were imposed upon the childish organism those affective impressions which were the mind's predigested food values. But note how this primitive construction of definitions or social affects is built up about the very simple, irreducible formula 'you and me,' that is to say, the self and its opposite—the self within and the self without. There is no basis of conscious evaluation. There is just this hypnosis of affects induced and sponsored by Mama and Papa as the major components of our affective nursery environment. There is no thought, no judgment, no authentic

[1] "The Need of an Analytic Psychiatry," paper read at the joint session of the American Psychiatric and American Psychoanalytic Associations, New York City, June 10, 1926. To be published in *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, Jan. 1927.

[2] "Psychiatry as an Objective Science," paper read at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1925, this *Journal*, v, part 4.

criterion of values. There is only affective response to impressions as the outer world of behaviour relates itself to *baby's* feeling. This is the equipment with which as children we grow up in the midst of our social environment—this affective equipment fashioned upon the universal formula, 'you and me,' that is to say, '*your* behaviour as it relates to *my* feeling.'

To-day, when we come to view this mental mood in cross-section, so to speak, the formulation 'good Papa,' 'bad Fido,' has become altered in proportion to the increase in the complexity of our social experiences. So that the same formula now reads, for example, 'I like Robinson,' 'I don't like Smith,' 'I understand Robinson,' 'Smith I can't make out,' 'Robinson is good,' 'Smith is bad.' That is to say, Robinson comports himself creditably, but Smith does not measure up so acceptably. Of course I do not define what it is to which he does not measure up. I do not consider whether or not my measure is a generally accepted standard, a permanent and established norm. But, reposing solely upon the suzerainty of my own feeling, 'I just don't like Smith'—and by this what I really mean is that he does not measure up to *my* standard.

I think we need to unearth the mechanism beneath these autogenic evaluations and discover whether there is not some, as yet, undisclosed element within them. Because I think it may be shown that our very highly complex mental evaluations in the sphere of philosophy and psychology, as of our ordinary human relationships, are built up precisely upon these underlying autocratic presumptions. It is these complex terms in the realm of our more elaborate formulations which we need to reduce to their primary 'you and me' elements. We need to reduce these social definitions, coincident as they are with such rudimentary affects as 'good Mama,' 'bad Fido,' etc., to simpler components.

For example, when I say 'I don't like Smith,' the action or movement expressed by the verb 'like' involves two terms, one of which is *I* and the other *Smith*. But it is noteworthy that in this equation, it never occurs to me to question but one of the two terms—namely, the term represented by Smith—that is to say, the term of the equation that is *not* I. The formula composed of the presumably neutral equation 'you and me' turns out then to be really not an equation at all, because already the terms are prejudiced and unequal. When I say 'I don't like Smith,' the implication is clear that it is Smith who deserves reproval or undervaluing because *I* don't like him. The 'I,' the self that does not like Smith, is exempt, you see, from all self-questioning. But who am I to be liking or not liking Smith? This is a matter into which the ego or 'I' does not look. The 'I' does not like Smith, and Smith is henceforth

anathema. And there endeth the chapter as far as Smith is concerned. The 'I,' you observe, possesses unquestionable authority. Through the apostolic succession of affects descending from the omnipotent and sovereign self-image begotten of the nursery, the 'I' is invested with papal infallibility. But, if we are really interested in studying the authenticity of our human emotions, this assumed prerogative of the 'I' must also come in for investigation. In a clear appraisement of our mental or subjective values such an investigation will, I think, appear more and more to afford rich and timely material for the laboratory of human behaviour.

To return now to the equation 'good Mama,' 'good Papa'—our primary 'you and me' relationship—we shall see that 'Mama' too has her prejudices in favour of the 'I.' 'Mama' says she is good—but does the servant whom she has dismissed on a false charge think her good? Not at all. On the contrary, in the view of the mishandled maid, 'Mama' is distinctly bad. 'Papa' likewise may subtly infect baby's mind with the notion that *he* is good. But his business associates down town, who have suffered serious financial loss through Papa's underhand negotiations, would by no means characterize his behaviour as good. Baby, however, knows nothing of this. He does not enjoy the vantage coign of observation based upon a wide and inclusive social survey. On the contrary, Baby's experiences are arbitrarily handed him by Mama and Papa from the basis of their prejudice in favour of the 'I.' Here, it is clear, there is offered a suggestion whereby the infant's mind is early prejudiced in favour of the infant's parents. Here in this early imbued emotional reference we may discover the original relationship of one individual to another. And from this primary formulation of an artificial 'you and me' we may begin to trace the extension socially of our universally coloured affects due to this factor of prejudice in favour of the 'I[1].' Here we begin to see this primary relationship at its generic source and the element of suggestion that underlies the common social factor of definition or affect. Clearly, this is not judgment; it is not criterion. It is an affect that is purely arbitrary, it is a definition that is entirely autocratic and presumptive.

If we will analyse these early mental evaluations of the individual, we shall see that they rest upon a quite unwarranted assumption. We shall see that in this attitude of the parent or nurse toward the infant, when they say 'good Papa,' 'bad Fido,' the 'good' and the 'bad' are

[1] "Social Images versus Reality," paper read at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Philadelphia, Pa., June, 7, 1924, *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, XIX, No. 3, October–December, 1924.

presumably assumed entirely with reference to baby as criterion. That is, Papa is good to *baby*—therefore Papa is good. Fido is bad to *baby*—therefore Fido is bad. But this is not baby's criterion at all. It is the criterion imposed by Mama and Papa on *their* baby. Here, in this artificial social equation is to be found, I think, the generic source of projections and of ideas of reference as they occur in the insane. But an analysis of the social mind will, I think, show that this so-called normal attitude of the nursery with reference to the infant underlies no less the normal thought processes of our so-called adult life. It will show that this early imbued emotional reference is responsible also for the presence unconsciously of these same mechanisms and reactions in the midst of our normal thought processes[1]. The infant that is taught projection comes in this way automatically into a habit-projection with respect to his subjective affects generally. As he grows up, the same reference to himself, formulated in the nursery as 'good Mama,' 'bad Fido,' extends to his subsequent formulation 'good Robinson,' 'bad Smith,' and this habitual social inference, based upon the unconscious suggestion of early nursery images, now dominates completely his opinions and behaviour with respect to his social environment generally.

It is my thesis then that such projections prevail with us all and that the consequence of such arbitrary social projections is inevitably an arbitrary social standard[2]. It is always the individual over there—Smith, Jones or Robinson—who does not conform to *my* standard and who must therefore readjust himself. Likewise, it is the philosophical theory or the psychological system of Smith or Jones or Robinson that must be repudiated because it is not in line with *my* philosophical system or theory. Here, you see, is really an arbitrary projection based upon the prerogative of the 'I.' If I am a Methodist, Methodism is good. So *I* say. But what I really mean is that Methodism is good because *I* am a Methodist. It is on this same basis that we rest such smug assumptions as 'the deluded Freudian,' 'the worthy pragmatist,' 'the misguided behaviourist,' 'the discerning introspectionist.' We have deserving France and undeserving Germany or *vice versa*. Further there is the meritorious believer and the wicked non-believer and on and on *ad infinitum*. But in all these evaluations our equation is false, because the only term evaluated is the term predicated, that is, the term opposite

[1] "Insanity a Social Problem," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXXII, No. 1, Part 1, July 1926.

[2] "Our Mass Neurosis," paper read at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Atlantic City, June 3, 1924, *The Psychological Bulletin*, June, 1926.

the 'I,' and that solely on the basis of the subject's criterion. Clearly this again is no equation at all. In all these definitions what I fail to recognize is that my criterion with respect to these systems is organically identical with my nursery prejudices in favour of 'Mama' or in abrogation of 'Fido.' I fail to see that, due to the prerogative of the 'I,' all my elaborately constructed opinions and beliefs within the subjective sphere are as completely subordinated to an arbitrary projection to-day as in the early nursery days of 'good Mama' and 'good Papa.'

If then the social affect is always a projection, if it always leaves out of account the internal or subjective term and demands that the responsibility of correcture rest upon the external or objective component, clearly our task is to turn to component number one, that is to say, to the subjective self that projects. This is supposedly the purpose of our technique in analysing the ontogenetic factors responsible for the insanity of the individual. Why should it not also be the purpose of our technique in analysing the phylogenetic factors that underlie the social mind if, in its mood expressions, the social mind is not less prejudiced in favour of the 'I' than the individual insane? If the insane individual's slogan *ego sum* is the sum of his ego, is it not equally true of our social ego with its arbitrary evaluations in the sphere of religion, philosophy, politics, psychopathology and of our broader subjective predications generally?

It would appear then from this hodgepodge of social affects that the situation is quite hopeless. It would appear that the present condition of the social mind—a condition in which all is but a futile exchange of projected affects—must continue to run riot as now and that the neuroses, individual and social, are irremediable. In spite of the implications I do not take this view. While I think it is true that the individual's affect is now beyond recall, that having become socially crystallized his whole conviction has gone out with it, and that he has now nothing with which to recall it, nevertheless I think it becomes possible through the adoption of a group or consensual technique of observation to create a basis for the recovery of the organism's primal integrity. It is thus possible to restore the natural *continuum* that was the original substrate of our mental organism prior to the artificial 'you and me' relationship first imbued through the emotional reference of the nursery period. With this socially phyletic *continuum* as a background, it has been experimentally demonstrated that the tendency of the individual to the projection of arbitrary affects may be objectively brought to book.

It must be clear that the remedy for the projection of an affect is the

recalling of the affect. It must be clear that if the quarrel I have with Smith is truly spurious, if the quarrel is really within myself and owes its meaning to a social reference bred of the nursery, it is only the recalling of such a quarrel back to myself that will lead the way to its resolution. This is precisely the function of a laboratory that attempts to observe subjective processes. The subjective laboratory is nothing else than the consensual observation of this subjective 'I' which has all this while remained unchallenged in its purely autocratic evaluation of everything and everybody about it. When in this laboratory the 'I' says 'I think,' 'I like,' 'I believe,' 'I am,' a consensus of observers insists upon the evaluation of that side of the equation, that is the 'I' when I arbitrarily 'like,' 'believe,' 'think,' or 'am.' The laboratory says to this 'I': 'Who are you?' 'On what basis do you stand?' 'Produce your credentials' 'Are you scientific or are you a bundle of unsuspected personal biases, having their generic source in the prerogative that is the mere prejudice of the "I"?' In other words, the individual is thrown back upon the internal or subjective side of his equation and is presented with the problem of recovering to himself the affect he has unconsciously projected upon another. But, if anyone thinks it a simple process to recall the projection of an affect, let him try it. Let him try it over and over and over again, for I promise him he has undertaken the impossible task. The projected affect does not return to the individual. He has lost all control of it. He is helpless in its hands.

For the sake of simplicity let us cite the most trivial example. The individual may say: 'I am irritated with that individual over there' or 'I feel sorry for this one' or 'This one seems kindly and I like him,' 'That one seems dominating and I resent his interference.' In each case the individual's mood is such as to be inaccessible to all approach. Our psycho-analytic legends to the contrary notwithstanding, his mood conviction is his sole conviction and, though it may be subject to temporary modification or assuagement, his essential mood conviction is unalterable. In this situation the laboratory technique consists in challenging the emotional reference or projection of the subject. The laboratory does not turn to the object of the individual's equation and argue pro and con as to the merits or demerits of the individual or object in question. The method of subjective investigation is exactly the reverse of this. Contrary to the tendency of habitual enquiry, the subjective laboratory turns as a consensus toward the subject or individual with a view to the objective analysis of the various elements entering into the subject, when the subject reacts; when, for example, he says, 'I am

irritated with this one,' 'I like that one,' 'I feel sorry for the other one,' 'I wish to take care of or be taken care of by still another' or whatever the equation may be.

In this process the subjective equation is found to be infinitely complex and correspondingly susceptible of an infinite reduction in the direction of simpler terms. The unexpected result of the reduction of the subjective component to its simplest terms proves to be the quite spontaneous reabsorption of his affect with respect to the objective component in question. That is to say, with the resolving of the subjective term to its irreducible elements there simultaneously occurs the subject's recognition of his complete continuity with the alleged differentiae of the object. Where formerly there was assumed an organic irreconcilability or resistance due to the unevenness of the equation based upon the prerogative of the 'I,' the disparity between the subject and object becomes resolved in a spontaneous identification between the two. This phenomenon, which I have had the opportunity of observing with others through the process of subjective group analysis, seems to me, if our observations have been correct, to constitute a laboratory finding as important as it is remarkable.

And so if it is true that my criticism of Smith is to be traced to a complex social suggestion, and if upon the analysis and resolution of this social reference there remains no resentment or criticism whatever, there is clearly demanded a fundamental revaluation of our social relations generally. It is this that our laboratory experience demonstrates experimentally—that the social group with its social or public sentiment is but an emotional reference based upon the subjective prejudice of the 'I.' In such a finding we are going far, it seems to me, toward the establishment of an approach to our organic social relations such as may alleviate and ultimately eliminate completely our personal as well as our social conflicts and disharmonies.

I think then that if we will discard this prevailing mood criterion and look at the element of our personal affects from a disinterested objective basis of observation, we shall find that such social affects are in every instance a projection upon another—and an arbitrary projection—of a fallacious basis or criterion within oneself. Due to the systematization socially of this arbitrary prerogative of the individual, our judgments with respect to one another assume an entirely autocratic basis that is inaccessible to individualistic analysis, and our social as well as our individual mind is completely closed to any effort of scientific or disinterested approach to it. In its mood autocracy this prerogative is

as systematized and as closed as the private systems of the insane. And so this spurious element in our mental life needs to be reckoned with very seriously as a factor in the causation of our functional disturbances. *For it is this arbitrary image-presumption which a consensual or laboratory basis of investigation will show, I think, to be the generic source of the germ, mental and social, of the neurosis as of the psychosis*[1].

With the more or less elemental orientation to be had through recourse to these early origins of man's personal affect, we shall find, I think, a more satisfactory objective placement for the accepted evaluations that have now grown more intricate, more complex. We shall find ourselves on somewhat surer ground in discussing the more refined academic terms upon which the complex formulations and evaluations rest that compose our philosophies, our psychologies and our logic. Such definitions as affect, feeling, concept, unity, democracy, love, God, humanity, home, mother, personality, the organism—all these and a thousand other terms will take on a new complexion, because the personal colour with which they were invested can now be removed and replaced with criteria of consensual and entirely impersonal evaluations[2].

In speaking for the laboratory with which I am associated I must not be understood as offering anything of myself. A laboratory does not represent the work of an individual. Nor must I be understood as advocating primarily anything in the nature of a cure. A laboratory is not primarily interested in cures. The sole purpose of the laboratory is research or the investigation of causes in the light of the immediate conditions observed. But while it is not the primary interest of the laboratory to effect cures, it is the thesis of the subjective laboratory that the objective observation of disturbed and personally coloured subjective states is itself the automatic remedy for such states. It must be emphasized, therefore, that it is not my purpose to offer a panacea for our mental and social ills. Not at all. I wish merely to indicate the nature of researches that have led to the development of a social or group technique in the observation of subjective mental states. This technique, in tracing our

[1] "The Laboratory Method in Psychoanalysis," paper read at the Ninth Congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, Bad Homburg, Germany, September 1925, *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, v, No. 3.

"The Group Method of Analysis," paper read at the meeting of the Washington Psychoanalytic Society, November 14, 1926. To be published in a forthcoming issue of *The Psychoanalytic Review*.

[2] "The Heroic Rôle—An Historical Retrospect," paper read before the Section of Historical and Cultural Medicine of the New York Academy of Medicine, March 26, 1925. *Psyche*, No. 25, July 1926.

mental contagions and disharmonies to their generic source, has led to the isolation of the simpler elements underlying our defections of consciousness. These simpler elements, when submitted to a subjective analysis, conducted under the organized conditions of a consensual basis of observation, lead us to place the underlying causation of mental and nervous disharmonies in what I have cited as the emotional reference contained in the subjective prejudice of the 'I.' It is my feeling that a like technique of observation with respect to this subjective prerogative will inevitably lead others to this same generic source. That this causation is disclosed only in a common or social interpretation of the insanities is also a finding which I feel will be fully corroborated by those to whom the opportunity for laboratory research appeals as offering a field of interest and needful investigation.

REPORT OF SYMPOSIUM ON THE DEFINITION AND DIAGNOSIS OF MORAL IMBECILITY[1]

8th March, 1926[2]

Dr TREDGOLD: At the outset it may not be inopportune to remind you of the reason for the definition of moral imbeciles in the Mental Deficiency Act, and I can speak from personal experience regarding this because I gave evidence before the Royal Commission on the Feeble-minded twenty years ago. The reason was this; evidence was forthcoming that a class of persons existed who were mentally defective; that this defect was coupled with marked anti-social propensities, but that its nature was such that it was exceedingly difficult to get them certified as feeble-minded. They were therefore called moral imbeciles and became the subject of a special definition. Experience has confirmed me in the opinion that this evidence was correct, and although I regard moral imbeciles as relatively rare, I have no doubt that they exist. I entertain no doubt that moral imbeciles are mentally defective and I have never seen one whom I should not regard as coming within the legal definition of feeble-mindedness. But they are by no means illiterate, or defective in intellect as this term is ordinarily understood, and hence, in practice, they cannot be certified as feeble-minded.

It seems to me that Dr Burt has misunderstood my words with regard to the moral sense. I do not doubt that this is an acquirement, like the religious or aesthetic sentiments, but before they can be acquired the individual must possess an innate potentiality for acquiring them, and I consider this to be absent in the moral imbecile. Several statements in Dr Burt's paper seem to me to indicate that he fails to appreciate this very important biological distinction between an inborn quality and an inborn tendency to the development of that quality. Moreover, whilst I should prefer the term 'moral defective' to 'moral imbecile,' I cannot agree that this latter is incorrect, either psychologically or etymologically, and I strongly dissent from Dr Burt's suggestion to replace it by the very vague term *temperamental* defective. *I entirely disagree with the suggestion that the punishment must be at the hands of the law. I consider the definition to mean any kind of punishment which would have a deterrent influence upon the normal child.*

[1] This report was kindly provided by Miss D. Kipling Booth.—Ed.

[2] For text of Symposium papers see this *Journal*, Vol. VI, Part 1.

The time may eventually come when the practical difficulties in the way of certifying these persons as feeble-minded will no longer exist and the definition of moral imbeciles may then be discarded. But until that time does come I feel very strongly that it should be retained, perhaps with some slight modifications, since I think it does enable us to get under proper control persons who would otherwise escape certification.

Professor CYRIL BURT: All of us are agreed, I think, that the so-called 'moral imbecile' is exceedingly rare, and all of us, too, admit that the term by which he is officially designated in this country is neither a precise nor a happy one. The group appears to comprise two broad subdivisions: first, those who are mentally defective in the narrower sense but have also developed certain vicious or criminal propensities, and secondly those who show no defect of inborn intelligence, but seem, in virtue of some other inborn disposition, likely to commit repeated acts of vice or crime.

In regard to the first class, each contributor appears to agree that to certify such persons as feeble-minded on the ground of defect of intelligence is far better than to certify them as moral imbeciles on the ground of their vicious and criminal propensities. In regard to the second class, there might seem to be some small measure of disagreement between Dr Tredgold and the rest of us, but perhaps after all this is mainly a matter of words. In certain parts of his paper Dr Tredgold speaks, not of a defect in moral sense, but of a defect in the potentiality for its development. Here, therefore, he seems to be leaning towards the opinion nowadays accepted by all psychologists, that morality is not inborn but simply acquired. He evidently assumes that so-called moral deficiency must be a deficiency which is innate. Now it is generally agreed that the innate foundations of moral character are the common human emotions and instincts. The term 'temperament' has recently been revived to cover this innate basis or potentiality, and I have therefore proposed that it should be substituted for that of moral deficiency.

Dr Shrubsall appears to recognise two forms of temperamental defect: the one group suffers from propensities and feelings too strong to control, but the other from too little feeling. As a point of pure theory, I should willingly agree, but as a matter of practice, such cases seem so rare and difficult to diagnose that I should hesitate to include such a group among those legally certifiable. In most of these cases repression seems mainly to account for the apparent lack of feeling.

All that Dr Hamblin Smith has said about morality being an acquired rather than an inborn condition I myself would eagerly endorse, and I

am happy to see that Dr Rees Thomas "entirely agrees" with my division of mental deficiency into intellectual and temperamental types respectively. I see, however, that he adds to my two classes of defectives a third, those in which acquired psychoses or psychoneuroses constitute the permanent mental defect. Here, curiously enough, he seems to overlook the fact that by the terms of the statute this defect must also exist from an early age, whereas the rest of us consider that those who framed the Act had primarily in mind defects that were congenital. Nevertheless, he has by implication raised a most important issue. There seems to be a number of cases where the defect is not congenital, but is due to some intercurrent condition affecting the child during the period of mental development—the most perplexing being those characterised by disturbances of conduct—and at present these seem to fall under neither the Mental Deficiency Act nor any other. They could, however, be conveniently dealt with if the Act explicitly included, not only those whose defect was apparent at or soon after birth, but also those whose defect emerged at any time before growth and adolescence were over.

Dr HAMBLIN SMITH: There has been a great, and to me a surprising degree of consensus about the idea of the moral sense. I certainly thought some of the contributors believed in its existence, and therefore I took pains at the commencement to say why it was I considered the conception of an absolute morality entirely untenable, because I am sure that this conception has added a great deal of confusion to that which already exists on this and kindred topics.

The definitions of feeble-mindedness and of moral imbecility both require proof of permanent mental defect, and I believe the whole history of the Act shows that it was intended to exclude purely temporary conditions. This appears to be the great difficulty of certifying cases of mental disorder and aberrations of character which occur after an attack of encephalitis lethargica, when that attack does not occur in earliest childhood.

I entirely agree with Dr Cyril Burt that apart from defects of intelligence there are defects of character and temperament which have also to be considered, and that very often these are more important, but there would be an extraordinary difficulty in assessing these from the point of view of the facts which you must put down in your certificate if you are going to certify them at all.

I should like to say in conclusion that I deny the existence of the moral imbecile. For many years I have had a strong desire to see a moral imbecile, but I have not seen one, as *all the alleged cases of this*

condition, which have come under my notice, could either have been certified as feeble-minded, or have been cases of definite psychosis, or of mental conflict and repression.

Dr Rees Thomas: The term 'moral imbecility' is a legal term and does not constitute an invariable clinical entity in the medical sense. Common-sense dictates the necessity for detaining these cases—as in the outside world they only commit crimes and so pass in and out of prison—and punishment is unjust. It is possible to certify all cases as feeble-minded if the definitions are interpreted loosely, but it is questionable whether the legal authorities would regard this attitude with favour. I wish to stress the point that crime is very often committed during the period of the onset, maximum or decline, of an exacerbation of the permanent psychotic state. In all cases of neuropsychoses and psychoses it is understood that only 'permanent' cases—those that have failed to yield to treatment—would be included under 'moral imbecility.' The important factor in the psychosis is defective insight—partial loss of the autocritic faculty—and it is possible that to some extent this resembles Dr Tredgold's defective moral sense, but it is an acquired condition and is definitely associated with the psychosis. Excessive emotional changes or lowered emotional tone is possibly often due to conflicts, or possibly to simple dementia praecox, and therefore it is not in all cases the result of increased energy of the instinctive impulses.

Dr Shrubsall: The definition of the moral imbecile in the Mental Deficiency Act is an attempt by the legislature to deal with persons who are a danger or a nuisance to the community. To secure this it may well be argued that no objection should be raised to lawful extensions in the meaning of the words, provided this does not remove reasonable safeguards to the liberty of the individual, and this has been borne out by the wide reading which has been accepted by the medical profession and the judicial authorities. The chief danger in this lies in the possibility of certifying those whose defects would be curable by psychotherapy or further education, and against this risk some safeguards are required.

It would seem that there are cases which can be certified under the definition of moral imbecile, although in only a few instances would they comply with all the legal postulates. The cases I have in mind are characterized by their low emotional tone and persistent misconduct from childhood, despite careful upbringing. Their great feature is that this misconduct or callousness is shown in *all* directions, and it is usual to find neuropathic conditions in other members of the family. When

these people have shown the necessary strong propensities and have been ineffectively punished, they are clearly comprised in the definition.

Dr TREDGOLD: It seems to be unanimously agreed amongst those who have had administrative experience, at any rate, that the definition of moral imbecility serves a useful purpose and does enable us to give the necessary care and protection to a certain class of persons who cannot be certified. I have no doubt that they could all be described as feeble-minded, but it is not possible to certify them in this way, owing to a wrong conception of feeble-mindedness—the conception that mind contains nothing but intelligence. I have no doubt also that instead of 'moral imbecile' the term 'moral defective' would have been a better one, as I would quite agree with Dr Burt that these people are not imbeciles in the popular sense of the word.

I do not agree, in fact I totally disagree, with the term 'temperamental defective.' It seems to me that the term 'moral' has a very understandable meaning, whereas 'temperamental' has no such meaning, and it seems to me that its use will give rise to very great difficulty—as one or two speakers pointed out—in distinguishing between a real defective and the various conditions of psychosis, so that its use certainly would not make for better certification but would add to the confusion that already exists.

Just a word about 'undeterred by punishment.' It seems to me that this is not only a legal criterion which has got to be complied with, but that it does serve a very useful purpose from a diagnostic point of view. When a child continues to misbehave in spite of punishment it is an argument in favour of something being wrong with its mind, some inability to associate that punishment with his crime.

I have no doubt that the definition 'from birth or from an early age' in cases of moral imbecility does stand in the way of certification sometimes, and I am very glad to hear that it is proposed to try and amend this. At the same time, one has got to realize that some cases of mental defect are not cases of primary mental defect but of secondary mental defect. Having regard to these cases of Secondary Amentia the definition should be interpreted as meaning any age short of that at which an adequate degree of mental development is present. If mental development is arrested at an age (say 12) when the individual cannot properly maintain an independent existence it seems to me that it should be regarded as a mental defect. I should like to see 'from birth or from an early age' interpreted from that point of view. I should certainly refuse to certify a person as a moral imbecile at the age of 6 or 7, for the

reason that it is a time at which the controlling functions of mind have not been developed and you do not know positively that there will not be development later on. Personally I should hesitate to certify a person as a moral imbecile until he had reached adolescence.

[The symposiasts having opened the discussion the chairman, Dr R. H. Cole, called on Members of the Education and Medical Sections and Guests, to speak.]

Mrs E. F. PINSENT, C.B.E.: As the only member present to-night who was on the Royal Commission on the Feeble-Minded, I should like to point out, with regard to the origin of the definition of moral imbecility, that *the Royal Commission thought it was necessary to have some definition of moral defect because it was felt that the general practitioner would not certify those cases who showed moral defect or pathological deficiency unless some definition of that kind was framed.* The tendency at that time was to treat these defectives as persons who should be punished. I entirely agree that most of these cases, if not all, could have been included in the definition of the feeble-minded, but the Royal Commission did not feel that this definition would be generally accepted as covering and including moral defect. At that time a great desire was shown to distinguish between those who were criminals in the ordinary sense and those 'moral imbeciles' who committed crimes because they could not help it, that is, for lack of inhibitory powers and want of knowledge of right and wrong. We therefore tried to aid the general practitioner by giving some definition of such cases.

Dr CORNER: There seems to be general agreement that moral imbeciles can be certified as feeble-minded, but as a matter of fact, if they are certified according to the Act it cannot be done. You will remember in the definition of feeble-mindedness that mental defect must exist from birth or from an early age. From birth is from an early age, and this was put in for a very definite purpose. A question was asked in a committee of the House of Commons with regard to this, and Mr Pollock (as he then was) said that from a legal point of view 'from birth' was put in front of 'early age' to qualify the latter words. In the definition of the moral imbecile, however, it only says 'from an early age,' and at the Old Bailey, in the first case that came up after the Mental Deficiency Act was passed, it was held that 'early age' meant up to 16 or 17 years of age. This was a case under my care, and the most typical case of moral imbecility I have ever seen. In the case of the feeble-minded, the imbecile or the idiot, however, the definition says 'from birth or from an early age,' and by this Mr Pollock understood up to

4 or 5 years of age, and the Judge held this in Court in a case that came before him.

The great achievement of the Acts of 1913 was the inclusion of moral imbeciles. These were children that started comparatively normally and competed fairly with their brothers and sisters, although they were difficult, up to the age of puberty, but about that age mental defects became apparent.

Dr COOPER: Moral imbeciles are very real persons, though difficult to certify under the Mental Deficiency Act. Medical men in practice who have most to do with them regard them as feeble-minded persons with anti-social tendencies, and personally I think that the definition of the moral imbecile found in the Mental Deficiency Acts does serve to classify certain types of persons.

My experience of the moral imbecile is that he is an entirely unsuitable person to be with ordinary defectives, and I think really that the kind of régime he wants is that of a prison and not a training institution, because he is largely anti-social and has a very bad influence on the ordinary type of mental deficient.

Sir FREDERICK J. WILLIS, K.B.E., C.B.: I am very interested in the present discussion, because the Board of Control has been considering this very question. It is felt in many ways that the present definition is unsatisfactory. The Mental Deficiency Act was intended to provide care and control for persons who need protection and who do not come under the Lunacy Act, but this definition does preclude us from giving the advantage of the Act to some cases who need protection, and it is from this point of view that the Board of Control has been considering its amendment.

Our minds are rather running on the words 'from birth or from an early age,' because they very often create an important difficulty. Many general practitioners see a case at 14, say, who is undoubtedly a mental defective needing care and control, but as they cannot get an early history of the case they feel unable to certify. The definition which we are thinking of would run somewhat as follows: 'Persons in whose case there exists such an arrested or defective development of mind, whether innate or induced by disease, injury or otherwise, as to produce mental defectiveness not amounting to imbecility yet so pronounced that they require care, supervision and control for their own protection or for the protection of others.' We do not, of course, want to go to the other extreme, and bring in seniles, who also need care and control.

Dr EAST: I would like to suggest that there is a difficulty in keeping

Dr Burt's term of 'temperamental defective'—at any rate a difficulty which appeals to me—because *I do not know when a temperamental defect is due to conflict and repression or not.* Dr Burt does not help me very much by the case he quoted of a man who had had 50 convictions for indecent exposure. Unless there were other facts having an influence on the case it seems to me that this is obviously not a case of moral imbecility but of psycho-neurosis. It seems to me that one can learn more about moral imbecility not by trying to prove what it is, but by trying to prove what it is not. It does seem curious that people should agree this evening that the moral imbecile is a very rare specimen to come across, whereas the Government supports one institution which is for those who are 'habitual criminals by law and nothing else.'

Dr HINKS (of Toronto): I have certainly nothing to add to this discussion, as I am here purely to learn, but I may say that in a clinic conducted in Toronto we had a few cases of children whom we diagnosed as moral imbeciles at 6, 7 and 8 years of age. In following up their histories later, however, we found that the moral part of the imbecility, if I may put it so, cleared up in a remarkable fashion, and I am wondering if it is possible to make diagnoses of moral imbecility at a very early age.

Dr J. A. HADFIELD: The discussion so far has concerned itself almost entirely with one phase of our subject, that of *definition*, and has omitted perhaps the more important factor, that of *diagnosis*. The main difficulty in diagnosis appears to be between 'moral imbecility' and the psycho-neuroses. The boy found stealing may be suffering either from so-called 'moral imbecility' or he may commit such an act because of repressed resentment, originating in latent antagonistic and rebellious tendencies or complexes formed in early childhood and which, being repressed, may not manifest themselves until the onset of puberty forces their sudden emergence in the form of a delinquency. The Substitution Delinquencies (of Healy), due to sexual repressions, are also of this type. The characteristics of such acts are very like those of so-called 'moral imbecility.' They are traceable to an 'early age,' they show strong 'vicious tendencies,' and they are 'undeterred by punishment'—the punishment frequently arousing the repressed obstinate and aggressive impulses to still greater activity. The only difference seems to be that 'mental defect' is found in one case and not in the other. If this is so, there seems to be no need for the use of the term 'moral imbecility.' We may then *classify the delinquencies into three groups—ordinary* CRIMINALITY, *due to wrong and anti-social sentiments, the treatment of which is to be found in the ordinary Courts of Law;* PSYCHO-NEUROSES, *due to morbid complexes, which should*

be dealt with by adequate psychological treatment; and MENTAL DEFICIENCY *(including cases of 'moral imbecility'), due mainly to physiological and constitutional factors, whose treatment is at present properly provided for by the authorities under the Mental Deficiency Act.*

But what at present happens to the psycho-neurotic delinquents? Probably many of them are wrongly treated as criminals and sent to reformatories or, on the other hand, as moral imbeciles—to neither of which classes do they properly belong.

Dr GORDON: I am inclined to agree with Dr Hadfield that there is no such thing as a moral imbecile, or at any rate that it is a very rare class when every case that has been diagnosed is taken away from it. The impression has been given during the present discussion that when you have got the definition you have finished with the matter, but as a matter of fact there is a very large group of cases which are a great puzzle to the magistrates and which cannot easily be certified as feeble-minded. It is very difficult in terms of the Act to get certification of the feeble-minded, because of the varying opinions both of magistrates and doctors as to what constitutes defect. There is this large group, and if only some means can be devised whereby calling them moral imbeciles is a starting-point after which those who are feeble-minded are certified in the ordinary way, and those cases which are in the early stages of dementia praecox, or are suffering from the effects of encephalitis lethargica, or from psycho-neurosis—are also diagnosed, some real advance would have been made. Unless this is done I think the special term 'moral imbecile' is going to add to the confusion rather than take away from it.

Dr R. H. COLE summed up from the chair the main points of the important discussion that had resulted from the valuable papers[1] and additional remarks of the authors of the Symposium on Moral Imbecility.

Both in his consulting practice and in his official capacity as Visitor under the Act he had considerable acquaintance with all grades of mental defectives, and he still regarded the term 'moral imbecility' as useful although having a very limited application. He deprecated the use of the term for children or even for mental defectives under the age of about 21. Early age in his view should be construed as co-equal with a period as late as adolescence, for the moral nature of an individual was not fully developed until maturity. So also the construction of the word 'permanent' in mental defect necessitated elasticity as to its legal meaning, or else it should be deleted in future amendments of the definitions of the Act.

[1] See *This Journal*, Vol. VI, Part 1.

CRITICAL NOTICE

Die Psychoide als Prinzip der organischen Entwicklung. Von E. BLEULER. Berlin: Julius Springer, 1925. Pp. vi + 152. Price M. 6·60.

La Psychologie organique. Par PIERRE JEAN. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1925. Pp. 297, with 102 figures in the text. Price 20 francs.

Though exceedingly different in style and treatment these two books say very much the same thing. Professor Bleuler's work may be regarded as an extension to the field of biology at large (and a considerable elaboration) of some of the ideas expressed in his book on the natural history of the mind[1]. The author expounds and defends the thesis that adaptive biological phenomena, such as reflex action and "the development of species," can only be explained by the hypothesis of the 'psychoid,' claimed by Professor Bleuler as a "purely scientific concept" (p. 11). In its working the psychoid is localised in the body as a whole, in the organ, cell, or part of a cell. As a concept the psychoid is derived from the psyche, but the human mind, as exhibited in the workings of the brain cortex (Rindenseele), is regarded as a specialised development of the psychoid at large. There is in fact, according to Professor Bleuler, a kind of hierarchy of psyche-like entities. What we ordinarily call our psyche appears only as a specialisation of a primitive psyche (Urseele) from which a brain-psyche (Hirnseele) and finally a cortical psyche (Rindenseele) have been developed. What remains in the subcortical brain and in the rest of the body after this differentiation we may call the 'body-psyche' (Körperseele). In so far as the 'Körperseele' does not belong to an individual alone but forms a continuous unity with his ancestors and descendants it is also a 'phylopsyche.' This phylopsyche, like the species itself, represents stages in a developmental series which have no sharp limits towards past and future. It comprises the modes of reaction of the whole subcortical system (reflexes to instincts) and is (together with these) to be contrasted with the cortical psyche of the individual. The latter works in detail according to individual experiences, but is guided in its aims by the old life-preserving instincts which are common to the individual 'brain-psyche' and the phylopsyche. The body-psyche of the individual and the phylopsyche together form a unity and may be called the psychoid. The common characters of the psychoid and the psyche (in the ordinary sense) are striving towards a goal and the utilisation of earlier experiences for the better reaching of the goal, which involves memory (Gedächtnis), *i.e.* engraphy and ecphory, and association, thus giving an analogy with the process of thinking (p. 33). [To give the reader as fair an impression as may be of Professor Bleuler's line of thought his own words are used as far as possible.]

The psychoid is to be thought of as neither corporeal nor static, but as a complex of functions, as a group of psychoid engrams active from time to time, together with the actual stimulus-reaction functions (p. 144). The functions of the psychoid are localised in every small portion of the body; for example, in each cell. We are not however to conceive of a plurality of psychoids, but of

[1] *Naturgeschichte der Seele und ihres Bewusstwerdens* (1921).

the psychoid as a kind of unified soul of the whole body. In one sense we may compare it with a magnet, each of whose parts acts as a magnet, just like the whole. But, unlike a magnet, each minute part of the psychoid has its special task and therefore its special partial psychoid with direct perceptions differing from those of all the others (pp. 141–2).

M. Pierre Jean's book is the first part of a work on the "theory of life," of which the second and third parts are to deal respectively with 'neural psychology' of the conscious and unconscious, and with heredity, descent, modification of characters, fertilisation, and death. The author's view is identical with Professor Bleuler's in that he regards the "psychology of nerve cells," which is the psychology of man and the higher animals, as only a specialisation of the psychology common to all living substance (organic psychology), just as contractility of the muscles is only a specialisation of the contractility common to all protoplasm. He holds that "the psychological fact" (le fait psychologique), the consciousness of will, exists objectively, and enters into a deterministic sequence of a special nature, that it is irreducible to other known (physico-chemical) factors, which cannot explain any of the phenomena of life. 'Will,' though not creating physico-chemical actions and remaining dependent on them, yet orientates and reacts upon them, is itself orientated in relation to an end given in advance, and also deals with the special properties of consciousness.

The psychological factor, says M. Jean, is defined objectively by the systematic orientation of its effects towards an end given in advance. Physico-chemical factors can never, by themselves, produce this result. If, then, we can recognise with certainty such a systematisation in a given series of phenomena we may be sure that a psychological factor has intervened in its determination, that the end has been willed (p. 8). Natural selection, the author admits, may be conceived of as capable of building up a mechanism which would give the appearance of such a systematisation; but, he contends, this cannot hold for cases "not foreseen in the organisation of the species, for artificial cases which would never be encountered in the conditions of natural life" (p. 9). If then, he concludes, in such artificial cases we can be certain that given biological phenomena (the reactions of the organism) are co-ordinated in relation to an end given in advance, there must be a psychological determination in the phenomena; and this, he undertakes to show in the course of the book, exists in plants and in unicellular organisms, is in fact a common property of all living matter. "The mystery of the psychology of the brain becomes the general mystery of life" (p. 20). Foresight and choice are for the present irreducible to physico-chemical factors. And if will is some day analysed into simpler elements that will not change its nature or its uniqueness. Few psychologists will disagree with this last thesis.

The rest of M. Jean's book is devoted to a detailed consideration of biological phenomena, the tropisms and the development of plants, the reactions of protozoa and of the cells of multicellular animals, the development, modification and regeneration, under different conditions, of organs and tissues. There is no need to follow the author through his discussions of particular cases, for his treatment is everywhere guided by his main thesis. It would be quite easy for the reviewer or any other biologist to write a book of equal length and, adopting M. Jean's point of view, to discuss an equal number of other cases and come to the same conclusion. But to do so it would be

necessary to ignore the whole trend of biological research and biological thought during the last quarter of a century. The author's method is made possible by the extremely obvious fact that structural and functional adaptation of organisms to their conditions of life is found everywhere throughout nature. Every kind of organism not only develops a form and structure which enables it to survive under its conditions of life but also possesses powers of reaction to those conditions which have, in general, the same effect. This general fact of adaptation has always excited man's interest, and not least since our enormously increased knowledge has clearly shown that it extends to finer structures and processes of which the biologists of an earlier generation did not suspect the existence. The problem of adaptation has often been called *the* great problem of biology, and many attempts have been made to find a general explanation. At one time it was natural for men to think that the adaptation of the organic world revealed the infinite wisdom, skill and loving care of the Deity in fashioning the animate creation; at a later date Darwin believed that he had found the universal (or nearly universal) key in the theory of natural selection. The author of this book takes a shorter cut. He simply attributes the will to survive and the knowledge of how to carry out this desirable aim to every organism and every cell. Just as a man feeling a cold draught of air in a room, gets up and shuts the window, so a protozoon swims away or a fungal hypha bends away, from a harmful substance. It is the same phenomenon. And since we know that the human action is connected with what we call will, all we have to do is to attribute the same faculty to all living substance. Very simple, but a little crude.

It would be easy to criticise M. Jean's detailed treatment. He betrays, to put it mildly, extremely inadequate acquaintance with modern research. He gravely discusses and condemns theories of plant tropisms which have been obsolete for 30 or 40 years, and he is evidently ignorant of modern biochemical work on the subject. The problems of the tropisms are still very far from being completely solved in terms of physics and chemistry, but real progress has been made and is now being made in this direction. M. Jean's artillery is directed against abandoned hypotheses of an earlier generation. Every time he demolishes one of these to his own satisfaction he concludes triumphantly that the tropistic reaction must be an expression of will.

In his introduction M. Jean argues, as we have seen, that when an organism reacts usefully to a stimulus which it has never met in the conditions of its natural life, its power to do so cannot be accounted for by natural selection. In discussing the movements of the pulvini of leaflets he points out that experimentally a pulvinus will still react to stimulation when its leaflet blade has been removed, so that no biological advantage is gained, and generalises to the effect that a reaction which does not adapt itself to an 'abnormal case' proves nothing against the psychological interpretation, because the organisation of an instinct is, as a rule, not modified in adaptation to an 'abnormal case.' He really cannot have it both ways. In reality, of course, both plants and animals show all kinds and degrees of variation of tropic reaction to various stimuli under different conditions, and it is really absurd to suggest that these variations are due to anything but differences in the actual physical and chemical forces at work under the different conditions of the experiments. In many cases this has been quite clearly established, and the appropriate physico-chemical explanation given. The 'psychological interpretation' is absolutely

irrelevant. The utility or non-utility of tropic reactions and reactions in general throws no light on the detailed working of the mechanism.

There is *no* general explanation of adaptation available, except the broad abstract statement that all organisms, like everything else of which we have knowledge, constantly tend towards equilibrium with all the forces acting upon them. And that does not get us very far, though it is sound as far as it goes. What we have to do is to investigate every individual case analytically and experimentally, and try to find out what the mechanism is and how it works in detail. We may then get light on how it came into existence. The modern biologist, says M. Jean, has a physico-chemical prejudice. Doubtless he has, and with good reason, since he has never found any other road that would lead him to solid results. We are still ignorant enough of the mechanisms of life, but we certainly know a great deal more about them than we did, and what we know has been attained in this way and in this way alone. It is easy to pile up rhetorical catalogues of vital phenomena which we cannot now explain in terms of physics and chemistry, but what advance has ever been reached in biology by invoking the 'psychological factor' or any other vitalistic or teleological conception?

Professor Bleuler's argumentation is a great deal less crude and a good deal less monotonous than M. Jean's, but on the whole it gives the same sort of impression of a *parti pris*. It is as if he had thought: "I am convinced that all organic processes are essentially psychical: now let me construct a theory showing how this can be so." "The mystery of the psychology of the brain," says M. Jean, "becomes the general mystery of life." "Quite so," says in effect Professor Bleuler, "then let us solve the general mystery of life by applying to it concepts which we use to help us in our efforts to understand the psychology of the brain." Hence the 'psychoid,' and the 'engrams' with which it works.

The engram part of the hypothesis is of course taken from Semon's well-known theory of the 'Mneme' and from Hering's "memory of living substance." The weakness of all such theories is twofold. First, the nature of the engram—in protoplasm at large as distinct from nerve cells—in terms of physics and chemistry (and after all an engram must depend on alteration in a material substance) is completely mysterious; and secondly, the theory 'explains' much more than we know to be true. Thus it necessarily involves a thoroughgoing belief in the inheritance of acquired characters. Professor Bleuler devotes eleven pages (including a great deal of small print) to this topic. He is quite evidently irritated with the biologists who refuse to accept such inheritance as proved, but his own arguments are not at all convincing. Thus he says (p. 83) that "a clearly understood (durchschauter) positive case would bring the required proof," and he cites several which he thinks fulfil the requirement. Now the reviewer is quite inclined to agree that there are cases where the germ cells are affected, directly or indirectly, by factors which affect the body cells, so that induced somatic characters appear in the next or some subsequent generation. Such cases have indeed been demonstrated on what looks like unimpeachable evidence. In some of these cases (not in all) we can form a reasonable conjecture as to how such an event may happen in terms of physics and chemistry, though in none have we anything like a thorough knowledge of the course of events. It may be that such 'inheritance' (or better, racial modification) is far more widespread and important in evolution then we have, at present, on the evidence, any right to assert. Some biologists hold that it is

of prime importance, basing their belief on the general nature of the characters that have been acquired by groups of species that have long existed under conditions which one may suppose would tend to induce such characters directly. But this sort of 'evidence' is far from being conclusive. Alternative hypotheses more in accordance with what we know of the actual processes of heredity and variation can always be plausibly put forward. In a word, we do not know and have no right to assume that "inheritance of acquired characters," in the sense of a somatic character or mode of reaction acquired during the lifetime of the individual so affecting the germ cells that it reappears in the offspring, is a general feature of evolution. It probably occurs, but there is no evidence that it is of general occurrence. The actual spatial and mechanical relations of soma and germ—the available means by which substances or stimuli could be transmitted from the former to the latter—are exceedingly different in different organisms and in respect of different characters, and we must therefore disallow Professor Bleuler's claim that one good positive case will bring the required (general) proof.

The only trustworthy *general* body of knowledge about heredity, based on controlled observation and experiment, is that which has been accumulated by the geneticists, and this is the only secure basis for theories of the origin of species. It is true that the basis is too limited for a satisfactory theory, and the geneticists as a class, realising this, have for the most part wisely abstained from theorising on evolution. The best account of what we may fairly conclude about the origin of species on the basis of our present knowledge is, in the reviewer's opinion, that presented by the Hagedoorns in *The Relative Value of the Processes causing Evolution* (The Hague, 1921). They barely consider the direct action of the environment, so little certain knowledge have we on the subject. It is doubtless true, as Professor Bleuler says, that there are many different factors involved. But with our existing knowledge we cannot assign a prominent place to the Lamarckian factor; and it is quite certain from the whole history of biological thought and work during the last 40 years that speculation based on the conviction of a teleological principle lying at the root of organic change is the most sterile of occupations.

Professor Bleuler, like M. Jean, is a convinced teleologist, and both look at organic phenomena through spectacles constructed as a result of contemplation of the human psyche. To a biologist this seems an inversion of the sound procedure. He looks upon the organic mechanisms which work to an 'end' as secondary results of the interactions of the forces at work in the organism with those of the environment in accordance with the physical principle of the universal tendency towards equilibrium. As for the marvels of organic 'adaptation' in structure and process, is not 'adaptation' seen in the shape and size of the planets and their speeds of rotation and translation in relation to their places in the solar system? Are not the ice caps of polar regions perfectly 'adapted' to their geographical positions, the size and shape of mountains to the rocks of which they are composed and the subaerial agencies at work upon them, river beds to their rivers, coast-lines to the action of the winds and waves? Is not the chemical substance *water* marvellously 'adapted' to its function of universal solvent; and, by possessing a maximum density at a temperature a little above its freezing point, to its rôle as the basis of the ocean, which renders possible the existing régime of the surface of this planet? It is true enough that the appearance of living organisms

introduces a new series of more intricate and marvellous 'adaptations.' Protoplasm is doubtless unique in its power of maintaining its autonomy and individuality as a system in 'moving equilibrium,' in its plasticity, and in its power of building up elaborate structures and of multiplying itself at the expense of substances which it takes up into its system. (And yet not quite unique is this last power, for autocatalysts do the same thing.) For these reasons it is also unique in the variety of its powers of direct and indirect adjustment of its 'system' to the external world. Of the structure and working of the system itself we still know little enough, but yet enormously more than we knew 30 years ago. And this knowledge has all been acquired by treating protoplasm as a physico-chemical system. No theory of 'engrams' or the like has helped us one iota.

As a good teleologist Professor Bleuler, like certain other psychologists[1], inveighs against "chance as the sole active developmental principle"—in fact he devotes a whole chapter to the topic. This is nothing but a bogey, set up for the purpose of being knocked down. What biologist ever hypostasises 'chance' in this way? As a matter of fact modern biologists do not deal in 'developmental principles' at all—such conceptions are quite useless for their purpose. What they deal with are the actual chemical substances and physical structures involved. The only excuse for Professor Bleuler is the obsolete theory that the material upon which selection works consists of small 'chance' variations in all directions. No one believes that now. And if they did it would not make 'chance' an 'active developmental principle.' On the other hand, it is quite certain that 'adaptations' are often indirect, i.e. that an organism may 'use' a trait of structure or process in a way which has no reference to the actual cause of the origin of the trait.

Professor Bleuler borrows from the geneticists their conception of the 'gene' and proceeds to use it in his own way. For him genes are really engrams. But until we know what engrams are this does not help us very much. The nearest we can get is that an engram is an *alteration* in protoplasmic structure. But what are these alterations? Have they any common quality other than that of being alterations? How can an alteration determine specific development? Surely it is the actual structure or substance as altered that determines altered development. And that is what genes are conceived by geneticists to be, though we do not yet know if and how far a gene may be altered. On the whole they seem to be strikingly fixed and permanent, though it is difficult to believe that they are never modified. We do not know what genes actually are. All we can say with our present knowledge is that they are those factors of development which are handed on from one generation to another. But we certainly know more about them than we do about engrams. It is quite possible that they are various in nature. On the evidence it is most probable that some at least are actual chemical substances, others may be physico-chemical systems of molecules. All that is *certain* is that a gene is *normally* inherited as a whole, for the positions of some of them on or in the chromosomes of the germ cells have been localised, and their distribution to, and effects upon, the new generation followed. To say that they must really be engrams is quite futile. It is noteworthy that Professor Bleuler admits that since seeds which are exposed to 'complete drying' and extreme cold may retain their capacity for development, and therefore their genes, intact, this

[1] Cf. Ferenczi, *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie* (1924), reviewed in this *Journal*, vol. IV, 156.

power of resistance is a ground (he says "the only ground," but to that we cannot agree) for holding that biological potentialities (biichsen Potenzen) "may be a simple expression of the constitution of the molecules" (p. 82); for the colloid nature of protoplasm, which the author postulates as the necessary substratum for his engrams, is temporarily lost under these conditions.

In the concluding chapter of his book Professor Bleuler rather unexpectedly rejects the vitalistic conception of life and the assumption of anything which has created living substance from outside: teleology in any other sense than is implied in the statement that what is alive must have the means to live. At least he says that these things are not proved and not even probable. On the other hand, he is sure that simple mechanism or chance must certainly be excluded (why he should couple 'mechanism' with his preposterous hypostasisation of 'chance' is not clear). In their place he would put purposeful striving, wholly analogous to the psychical, which, he thinks, is at once given by the 'Mneme,' holding that this is peculiar to living substance. But he says, striving and memory (Gedächtnis) appear already in substance which is not alive, so that all life is actually, in the last analysis, to be conceived mechanistically, but by the circuitous routes of special connexions of memory and energy which become increasingly complicated. With such a formulation no 'mechanistic' biologist can disagree. The mechanistic biologist is, however, profoundly sceptical of any help that can be rendered in the understanding of these circuitous routes by the general assumption of the 'Mneme' or by the attribution of 'purposeful strivings' to living substance at large.

It is interesting to enquire into the causes of the tendency of certain modern psychologists to carry psychological conceptions into biology, where they seem so much out of place. One cause is doubtless the reaction from the unjustified belief of the last generation of scientists that the phenomena of mind can be explained immediately in terms of physico-chemical mechanisms: another is the "nothing like leather" attitude natural to all specialists and now pushed too far by modern psychologists as a result of the great recent success of psychological conceptions. It is true enough that the activities of the human psyche have a great deal in common with the activities of the lowest organisms, and that we are bound to regard the former as in a certain sense a specialisation of the functions of the latter. Life is one in a very real sense. The gulf between the inorganic and the organic may well be regarded as wider and deeper than that between the coordinating functions of plants and the lower animals on the one hand and the self-conscious human mind on the other. The former gulf represents a real discontinuity—the protoplasmic machine, if we are right in regarding it as a machine, appears as something *sui generis*, however it may have actually come into being. In the latter case we are not so sure. The self-conscious mind appears to be something *sui generis* also, but we cannot 'get inside' the personalities of the earlier members of the human family, of the anthropoid apes, of the lower animals, and of plants; and comparative observation of the behaviour of living species is by itself inadequate for the correct appreciation of the nature of the introduction of self-consciousness. We have every reason to believe that the ascending evolutionary series culminating in man is a continuous series, progressing by small steps, and if we could project ourselves into the personalities of its successive members it is most

improbable that we should be able to say of any given step: "Here self-consciousness appears. This animal is self-conscious, its immediate ancestor was not."

When we add to this probability of complete continuity in development the consideration that a very large part of the reactions and behaviour of men are quite clearly based on a type of mechanism (reflexes, instincts) which he possesses in common with all other organisms, the need for some coordinating conception, which shall express the 'mainspring,' as it were, of the activities of all organisms begins to be felt. To a psychologist it is perhaps natural that such a conception should be psychological.

But at this point we are brought up against the hard fact that we cannot get away from our own psychology, which is essentially self-conscious, and consequently we read our own self-conscious psychology into the activities of organisms at large. We cannot possibly compass psychological thinking without using ideas derived from the phenomena of self-consciousness. Thus Professor Bleuler, with his conception of the psychoid, has to admit that it is constructed on the model of the self-conscious psyche. What right has he to say for instance (p. 8) that "every cell *knows* what part the others take in the new orientation, and what task is assigned to it itself"? It is true that in another place (p. 31) he expresses the behaviour of the cells in the regeneration of the lens of a young Triton when the original lens is removed in terms of physics and chemistry, and in 'biological' terms, as well as in psychological. But he claims that the psychological expression is not only legitimate but necessary, and in this he is offending against the cardinal scientific principle, which is simply an expression of universal experience, that you cannot 'explain' the 'lower' in terms of the 'higher,' the general in terms of the special. This is true and applies to the case in point even if we admit to the full that the human psyche shows a completely continuous development from the organisation of the lower organisms.

In practice we must, in the field of human psychology, use a distinct set of concepts which have no application in biology. Because we cannot bridge the gulf between mind and body this procedure is forced upon us, and it seems improbable that we shall ever be able to escape from it, however fully we may in the future come to understand the mechanism of the brain and its interactions with the rest of the nervous system and the rest of the body. That understanding, which will of course be part of the understanding of the mechanisms of protoplasm and its products, of life in general, can only be sought along the well-tried paths of biological research, which ultimately means expression of the phenomena in terms of biochemistry and biophysics. So far as we can ever attain a synthesis we must begin from the undifferentiated, from the general, and express the differentiated, the special, in terms of it. Such a synthesis may well greatly illuminate the psychology of the self-conscious mind, but will scarcely abolish or render it unnecessary, because the phenomena of the self-conscious mind are given as something *sui generis*, with concepts and laws of their own.

A. G. TANSLEY.

REVIEWS

Pleasure and Pain. A Theory of the Energic Foundation of Feeling. By PAUL BOUSFIELD, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd. 1926. Pp. x + 114. 4*s.* 6*d.* net.

Instincts, even those of self-preservation and reproduction, are less important as springs of conduct than has usually been taught. Rather is there a state of 'tension,' whose increase produces pain and whose decrease, pleasure. The ultimate source of behaviour is the effort to avoid painful tension, and the other so-called instinctive acts arise secondarily from this. To some extent there is a normal tension during individual life. This is increased by any stimulation and we suffer pain, in a broad sense of the word, in direct proportion to the amount of our tension. When tension is relieved we experience pleasure, whose amount depends on the rate of diminution of tension.

Such is the argument of this book of 113 small pages which provide interest, if not conviction. No clear definition of 'tension' is to be found, yet the author expresses his ideas with the help of pseudo-graphs and pseudo-mathematical formulae; *e.g.* '$\pi = \tan \theta . sc$, where π represents the amount of pleasure...' etc.

As all this is innocent of any foundation in measurement, experiment or real value, it must be classed as pseudo-scientific and quite unsatisfactory.

The working out of the action of Imagination in Hope and Fear, whereby pain and pleasure are prolonged and increased by fore-pleasure and fore-pain, is distinctly interesting and leads to some suggestions on the foundation of masochism.

N. H. M. BURKE.

Personality. By R. G. GORDON, M.D., B.Sc., M.R.C.P. (Edin.). London: Kegan Paul and Co. Ltd. 1926. Pp. xiv + 302. 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

Amongst the host of books on psychological topics, the present volume is distinguished by having been written by a practising physician. This endows it with a special value. Provided that such an author is competent to treat his subject, as Dr Gordon unquestionably is, the practising physician has to deal with many types of abnormal personality, and is less likely than is the purely academic writer to overlook the necessity of considering the personality as a whole.

It has long been clear that all work on this subject will be quite futile unless it commences with a definite attitude upon the fundamental question of the relation between mind and body. Dr Gordon takes up this problem at the outset. Having given a summary, necessarily brief, but accurate, of the various theories which have been held on the psycho-physical relation, he declares himself a follower of Spinoza. We may remark, in passing, that it is striking how deeply the work of Spinoza is influencing modern thought. But the illustration given by Dr Gordon of the 'two-aspect' hypothesis, that of the visual and the auditory phenomena presented by a clock, does not strike us as altogether happy. A better and a more usual example is that body and mind may be regarded as two faces of one clock. Later, Dr Gordon states that the central nervous system "organizes both physical and psychical activity." Spinoza would not have subscribed to this doctrine. He never allows that the psychical is dependent upon the physical, although he constantly warns us that psychological and physiological studies must proceed concurrently.

Dr Gordon accepts the principle of 'emergent evolution,' as it has been enunciated by Lloyd Morgan and Alexander. New emergents are characterized by a 'special relatedness.' And every personality is to be regarded as a new emergent. To adopt the term 'Deity,' in Alexander's sense, as describing the 'goal of the world's progress,' seems somewhat unfortunate, raising as many possible misunderstandings as does Spinoza's famous 'Deus.' But Dr Gordon's aim is essentially practical, and from that point of view it can be argued that metaphysical questions may be left aside.

Having dealt with the "temperamental factor in personality," and with the "further organization of mental function," Dr Gordon passes to a discussion of variations in personality. In this chapter, the influence of that part of Spinoza's *Ethics* which deals with the power of the emotions is very evident. We then come to a consideration of the recent contributions to the study of personality, and the majority of readers will regard this as the most important part of the work.

The book is announced as intended to serve as a text-book of modern psychology for doctors. This is a high claim, and is, probably, not meant to be taken too literally. But the author has given an adequate, and a fair description of the views held by the great protagonists of modern psychology. Naturally, he starts with Freud. He is not a Freudian. But he gives full credit to the discoverer of psycho-analysis. He points out that the conceptions of mental conflict, repression, sublimation, and the like, are now commonplaces amongst psychologists. And due attention is called to the value of the psycho-analytic study of dreams in the rectification of the abnormal personality. Some of the Freudian terminology is criticized as being loose, particular exception being taken to the 'censorship.' It must be admitted that there is some danger that this conception may be personified. The author thinks that caution must be adopted in attributing a sexual character to dream symbols. He gives the example of a soldier who had been much alarmed by a large snake, and whose dreams contained this feature; and he urges that it is not necessary, in such a case, to look for a sexual meaning. It might, however, be replied by Freudians that we must consider why it is that intense alarm is so constantly associated with snakes. But, on the whole, the followers of Freud have little to complain of in Dr Gordon's presentation of their case.

Jung's contribution is then taken up. As the early part of the book led us to expect, the author is disposed to accept the view of the Zürich school. The teleological character of Jung's theory is obviously attractive to Dr Gordon, as contrasted with the determinism of Freud; although the treatment accorded to the general question of determinism is perfectly fair. The conflict between the two views is fundamental and irreconcilable. Jung's famous 'psychological types' are well described and illustrated, and the reader will have no difficulty in recognizing at least some of these types amongst his friends or patients.

The importance of universal human bisexuality was hinted at in the discussion of Jung's contribution. And this subject is continued when Adler's view comes under consideration. It is not necessary to indicate the importance of this bisexuality in elucidating the riddle of certain sex perversions. The resemblance of Adler's view to that of Nietzsche is pointed out, as is also the fact that Adler holds that in almost every case of inferiority of bodily organs there is an inferiority of the sexual apparatus. It has not yet been sufficiently worked out whether the difference between Adler and Freud is really fundamental, as that between Jung and Freud undoubtedly is.

Too little attention has been given, in this country, to the work of Kempf. Dr Gordon shows how this writer attempts to find a physiological basis for all his conclusions. It is quite likely that we shall come to regard these theories as complementary, and not as antagonistic, to psychological explanations.

The final portion of the book is of a practical character. A very good account is given of the neurotic personality. The symptoms of the physical malady, in a neurosis, constitute, for the patient, a compromise; but this compromise is never lasting, for a new conflict is initiated by the inconvenience of the malady. The neurotic is unstable, but he is not necessarily useless, and many neurotics have been honoured members of society. Hysterical symptoms, together with much of the behaviour of normal persons, is analysed under six heads, inferiority feelings, sequelae of physical trauma,

stress of great emotion, hetero-suggestion, imitation, and habit continuations of temporary organic disabilities. The classification is new to us, and seems to be useful.

Dr Gordon deals with the delinquent personality. Such a type is definitely a new emergent, and requires individual study. But this is constantly overlooked by our law administrators, who are always anxious to devise 'systems' for the treatment of the delinquent. The author stresses the influence of inferiority feelings in the production of crime, and he follows most modern authorities in holding that the deliberate choice of a criminal career is very rare. But he is too subservient to judges and magistrates when he says that we must not presume to criticize the methods which their experience has shown to work well. It is just because experience has shown the present methods to work badly that students of this subject plead for a change, in the direction of intensive individual study, prior to the initiation of treatment.

The discussion of the 'dissociated personality' is unduly brief, having regard to the importance and the complexity of the subject. And when he takes up the 'retarded personality,' the author is too inclined to do homage to the popular idol of 'mental age.' He states that it is impossible for a person with a mental age of under 12 years to maintain himself in the world 'at a reasonable standard.' There are many persons with a mental age considerably below that limit who are very useful citizens. Much of the world's work can be done by those of a low order of intelligence. Dr Gordon recognizes the discontent which is produced by doing work which is below the worker's standard of intelligence. If by eugenic breeding, or other means, the average standard of intelligence were raised, the amount of unrest in the world would be much increased.

The book is much to be commended. It should induce practitioners to pay greater attention to the psychology of their patients, and to seek the aid of psychological experts more frequently. Whether this aid is sought from a follower of Jung or of Freud does not so greatly matter. The end of the present controversies will be peace. Much of the dust is raised over terminology. The antagonists would do well to remember what Hobbes said about words. Some of the differences are fundamental. But a method which is suitable for one case may not necessarily be so for another patient. Ultimately, what is found to be practically useful will persist, and the stubble will be burned.

The one adverse comment which we have to make upon the get-up of the book is that the plan of collecting the references to authorities at the end of the volume is inconvenient. It seems preferable to give them currently.

M. HAMBLIN SMITH.

Der Ursprung der Tragödie, ein psychoanalytischer Beitrag zur Geschichte des griechischen Theaters. Von ALFRED WINTERSTEIN. Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. 1925.

Scholars who have tried to account for the origin of Greek drama have been faced with the question whether there is any historical link between the formal hieratic art of Aeschylean tragedy and a series of primitive rituals—vegetation magic, puberty initiations, folk plays and dances, etc.—known to us partly from the customs of savage peoples, partly from survivals of paganism in Europe. If such a connection existed, it was not necessary to suppose that the development took a long time, for Greek culture, in all its manifestations, grew with extraordinary, perhaps unparalleled, rapidity. But the Greeks also had a way of forgetting completely even their recent past, and there was very little documentary evidence to bridge the gap. The argument rested chiefly on particular features in the traditional form of the Greek plays; and it proved convincing only to minds of a certain type, who found that the supposed ritual background enriched the tragic art with a significance that they felt to be profound, but could not explain. When a one-eyed student set out to prove that tragedy had no connection with vegetation spirits or puberty rites or even with Dionysus himself, but arose solely from the worship of ancestors, it was not difficult

to give the scanty evidence the necessary twist. Here, in default of fresh facts, the question seemed likely to remain at a deadlock.

Recently the genius of Freud has opened out a new avenue. The evidence denied to us by the documents may be sought in our own minds. Baron Winterstein, among others, is following the clue of psychological interpretation indicated in *Totem und Tabu*. He is well acquainted with nearly all the relevant literature on the classical side, and his conclusions are in general harmony with those of Dieterich, Jane Harrison, Gilbert Murray, and other scholars who have sought illumination in anthropology. As one who accepts these conclusions and has tried to carry them further in the explanation of the origin of Attic Comedy, I welcome the support of Psychology, and I believe that, in a generation or two, nearly all classical scholars will admit that the case is proved. Baron Winterstein makes some interesting contributions; but the reader who is not deeply versed in the new psychological literature will doubt whether the interpretation of particular psychic phenomena is as yet certain enough to build upon. Can he be sure, for instance, that the 'killing' of candidates in puberty initiations is a punishment for their unconscious wish to murder their fathers (Reik)? This may be so; but the practice can be explained without this hypothesis. For Tragedy the significance of New Birth and of the Scapegoat are of central importance, and here the last word certainly lies with the psychologist, when he is ready to pronounce it. Meanwhile hypotheses that cannot yet be verified are not to be ruled out as useless. From the welter of seemingly wild suggestions and guesses, probabilities will some day be sifted out by criticism. Both psychologists and classical scholars will profit by reading this book with an open mind—all the more, if they can keep their minds open after reading it.

F. M. CORNFORD.

Les Nevroses dans l'Alcoolisme et l'Alcoolisme comme Maladie "sui generis." By Dr SERGE MIKHAELOFF. Librairie Félix Alcan. 1926. Pp. 170. Price 10 fr.

By Alcoholism the author does not mean a tendency to excessive drinking; he means the group of maladies induced by alcohol. Respecting mental disorders caused thereby, our modern tendency is to regard alcohol as a toxic agent which weakens the repressing forces and thus allows the make-up of the patient's unconscious to express itself as a sort of mania, melancholia, dementia praecox or some other psychosis or neurosis, and not to consider Alcoholic insanity as a clinical entity. On this point the two parts of this book mentioned in the title are mutually contradictory. In the one the author claims that Alcoholism, in the above sense, is a disease "sui generis" and in the other he describes epilepsy, hysteria and neurasthenia of alcoholic origin. Why he does not go on to include other psychoses or why he describes delirium tremens in the first part and not in the second as an alcoholic confusional psychosis is a puzzle which remains unexplained.

The description of Alcoholism as a disease is very much *secundum artem*; but the disquisition has the flavour of a teetotal propaganda. This impression is enhanced by the report that alcohol has been found in the brain of a person who died 78 hours after drinking alcohol, the suggestion that a person who has a glass of wine every day is permanently under the influence of alcohol, and the repetition of the ancient myth that conception during drunkenness produces an idiot and that alcoholism generally causes azoospermia and atrophy of the ovules.

There appears to be some evidence that the book was written years before it was published. For example, the author expresses much gratification at the results of prohibition in Russia but makes no reference to prohibition in the United States of America. Moreover, the blue cover of our copy has a yellow discoloration at the back and top as if it had been exposed for a considerable time to the influence of light.

W. H. B. STODDART.

Psychologie Pathologique. By Dr H. WALLON. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris. 1926. Pp. 95. Price 6.25 fr.

Dr Wallon attempts the study of mental disorder from the psychopathological rather than psychiatrical point of view, but not very successfully. The psychical origin of symptoms receives from him less consideration than organic causes, pathological constitution and heredity. The conscious, subconscious and unconscious are described, but their intimate bearing on mental symptoms is scarcely discussed; while his reference to psychoanalysis as freudism with a small f shows which way the wind blows.

The Chapter on Mental Deficiency would not be out of place in a psychiatrical text-book; nor would the brief accounts of delusional states, disordered conduct, neuroses and psychoses. The book is all right in its way, but there is not much of the psychopathology promised in the opening sentences; which is all the more surprising when we find the author described on the title-page as "Professeur à l'Institut de Psychologie de l'Université de Paris."

W. H. B. STODDART.

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